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E-voting systems are a powerful technology for improving democracy by reducing election cost, increasing voter participa-
tion, and even allowing voters to directly verify the entire election procedure. Unfortunately, prior internet voting systems
have single points of failure, which may result in the compromise of availability, voter secrecy, or integrity of the election
results.
In this paper, we present the design, implementation, security analysis, and evaluation of the D-DEMOS suite of dis-
tributed, privacy-preserving, and end-to-end verifiable e-voting systems. We present two systems: one completely asyn-
chronous and one with minimal timing assumptions but better performance. Our systems include a distributed vote collec-
tion subsystem that provides immediate assurance to the voter her vote was recorded as cast, without requiring cryptographic
operations on behalf of the voter. We also include a distributed, replicated and fault-tolerant Bulletin Board component,
that stores all necessary election-related information, and allows any party to read and verify the complete election process.
Finally, we also incorporate trustees, i.e., individuals who control election result production while guaranteeing privacy and
end-to-end-verifiability as long as their strong majority is honest.
Our suite of e-voting systems are the first whose voting operation is human verifiable, i.e., a voter can vote over the
web, even when her web client stack is potentially unsafe, without sacrificing her privacy, and still be assured her vote was
recorded as cast. Additionally, a voter can outsource election auditing to third parties, still without sacrificing privacy. Finally,
as the number of auditors increases, the probability of election fraud going undetected is diminished exponentially.
We provide a model and security analysis of the systems. We implement prototypes of the complete systems, we measure
their performance experimentally, and we demonstrate their ability to handle large-scale elections. Finally, we demonstrate
the performance trade-offs between the two versions of the system. A preliminary version of our system was used to conduct
exit-polls at three voting sites for two national-level elections and is being adopted for use by the largest civil union of
workers in Greece, consisting of over a half million members.
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1. INTRODUCTION
E-voting systems are a powerful technology to improve the election process. Kiosk-based e-
voting systems, e.g., [Chaum 2001; Chaum et al. 2005; Fisher et al. 2006; Chaum et al. 2008;
Benaloh et al. 2013; Culnane and Schneider 2014], allow the tally to be produced faster,
but require the voter’s physical presence at the booth. Internet e-voting systems, e.g.,
[Cramer et al. 1997; Adida 2008; Clarkson et al. 2008; Kutylowski and Zago´rski 2010;
Gjøsteen 2013; Zago´rski et al. 2013; Chaum 2001; Chaum et al. 2008; Zago´rski et al. 2013;
Kiayias et al. 2015], however, allow voters to cast their votes remotely. Internet voting systems
have the potential to enhance the democratic process by reducing election costs and by increas-
ing voter participation for social groups that face considerable physical barriers and overseas
voters. In addition, several internet voting systems [Adida 2008; Kutylowski and Zago´rski 2010;
Zago´rski et al. 2013; Kiayias et al. 2015] allow voters and auditors to directly verify the integrity
of the entire election process, providing end-to-end verifiability. This is a highly desired property
that has emerged in the last decade, where voters can be assured that no entities, even the election
authorities, have manipulated the election result. Despite their potential, existing internet voting
systems suffer from single points of failure, which may result in the compromise of voter secrecy,
service availability, or integrity of the result [Chaum 2001; Chaum et al. 2005; Fisher et al. 2006;
Chaum et al. 2008; Benaloh et al. 2013; Cramer et al. 1997; Adida 2008; Clarkson et al. 2008;
Kutylowski and Zago´rski 2010; Gjøsteen 2013; Zago´rski et al. 2013; Kiayias et al. 2015].
In this paper, we present the design and prototype implementation of the D-DEMOS suite of
distributed, end-to-end verifiable internet voting systems, with no single point of failure during the
election process (that is, besides setup). We set out to overcome two major limitations in existing
internet voting systems. The first, is their dependency on centralized components. The second is their
requirement for the voter to run special software on their devices, which processes cryptographic
operations. Overcoming the latter allows votes to be cast with a greater variety of client devices, such
as feature phones using SMS, or untrusted public web terminals. Our design is inspired by the novel
approach proposed in [Kiayias et al. 2015], where the voters are used as a source of randomness
to challenge the zero-knowledge proof protocols [Feige et al. 1988]. We use the latter to enable
end-to-end verifiability.
We design a distributed Vote Collection (VC ) subsystem that is able to collect votes from voters
and assure them their vote was recorded as cast, without requiring any cryptographic operation from
the client device. This allows voters to vote via SMS, a simple console client over a telnet session,
or a public web terminal, while preserving their privacy. At election end time, VC nodes agree on a
single set of votes. We introduce two versions of D-DEMOS that differ in how they achieve agree-
ment on the set of cast votes. The D-DEMOS/Async version is completely asynchronous, while
D-DEMOS/IC makes minimal synchrony assumptions but is more efficient than the alternative.
Once agreement has been achieved, VC nodes upload the set of cast votes to a second distributed
component, the Bulletin Board (BB ). This is a replicated service that publishes its data immedi-
ately and makes it available to the public forever. Finally, our trustees subsystem, comprises a set of
persons entrusted with secret keys which can unlock information stored in the BB . We share these
secret keys among the trustees, making sure only an honest majority can uncover information from
the BB . Trustees interact with the BB once the votes are uploaded to the latter, to produce and
publish the final election tally.
The resulting voting systems are end-to-end verifiable, by the voters themselves and third-party
auditors, while preserving voter privacy. To delegate auditing, a voter provides an auditor specific
information from her ballot. The auditor, in turn, reads from the distributed BB and verifies the
complete election process, including the correctness of the election setup by election authorities.
Additionally, as the number of auditors increases, the probability of election fraud going undetected
diminishes exponentially.
Finally, we implement prototypes of both D-DEMOS voting system versions. We measure their
performance experimentally, under a variety of election settings, demonstrating their ability to han-
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dle thousands of concurrent connections, and thus manage large-scale elections. We also compare
the two systems and emphasize the trade-offs between them, regarding security and performance.
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
— We present the world’s first suite of state-of-the-art, end-to-end verifiable, distributed voting
systems with no single point of failure besides setup.
— Both systems allow voters to verify their vote was tallied-as-intended without the assistance of
special software or trusted devices, and allow external auditors to verify the correctness of the
election process. Additionally, both systems allow voters to delegate auditing to a third party
auditor, without sacrificing their privacy.
— We provide a model and a security analysis of D-DEMOS/IC.
— We implement prototypes of the systems, measure their performance and demonstrate their abil-
ity to handle large-scale elections. Finally, we demonstrate the performance trade-offs between
the two versions of the system.
Note that, a preliminary version of one of our systems was used to conduct exit-polls at three vot-
ing sites for two national-level elections and is being adopted for use by the largest civil union of
workers in Greece, consisting of over a half million members.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces required background
knowledge we reference throughout the paper, while Section 3 presents related work. Section 4
gives an overview of the system components, defines the system and threat model, and describes
each system component in detail. Section 5 goes over some interesting attack vectors, which help to
clarify our design choices. Section 6 describes our prototype implementations and their evaluation,
and Section 7 concludes the main body of the paper. Finally, Appendix A provides, for the interested
reader, the full proofs of liveness, safety, privacy and end-to-end verifiability of both our systems.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section we provide basic background knowledge required to comprehend the system de-
scription in the next section. This includes some voting systems terminology, a quick overview of
Interactive Consistency, and a series of cryptographic tools we use to design our systems. These
tools include additively homomorphic commitment schemes and zero-knowledge proofs, which
are used in the System Description (Section 4), and are needed to understand the system design.
Additionally, we provide details about collision resistant hash functions, IND-CPA symmetric en-
cryption schemes, and digital signatures, which we use as building blocks for our security proofs in
Appendix A.
2.1. Voting Systems requirements
An ideal electronic voting system would address a specific list of requirements (see [Neumann 1993;
Internet Policy Institue 2001] for an extensive description). Our system addresses the following re-
quirements:
— End-to-end verifiability: the voters can verify that their votes were counted as they intended
and any party can verify that the election procedure was executed correctly.
— Privacy: a party that does not monitor voters during the voting phase of the election, cannot
extract information about the voters’ ballots. In addition, a voter cannot prove how she voted to
any party that did not monitor her during the voting phase of the election1.
— Fault tolerance: the voting system should be resilient to the faulty behavior of up to a number
of components or parts, and be both live and safe.
1In [Kiayias et al. 2015], this property is referred as receipt-freeness.
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2.2. Interactive Consistency
Interactive consistency (IC), first introduced and studied by Pease et al. [Pease et al. 1980], is the
problem in which n nodes, where up to t may be byzantine, each with its own private value, run an
algorithm that allows all non-faulty nodes to infer the values of each other. In our D-DEMOS/IC
system, we use the IC,BC-RBB algorithm from [Diamantopoulos et al. 2015], which achieves IC
using a single synchronous round. This algorithm uses two phases to complete. The synchronous
Value Dissemination Phase comes first, aiming to disperse the values across nodes. Consequently,
an asynchronous Result Consensus Phase starts, which results in each honest node holding a vector
with every honest node’s slot filled with the corresponding value.
2.3. Cryptographic tools
2.3.1. Additively homomorphic commitments. To achieve integrity against a malicious election
authority, our D-DEMOS utilizes lifted ElGamal [El Gamal 1985] over elliptic curves as a non-
interactive commitment scheme that achives the following properties:
(1) Perfectly binding: no adversary can open a commitment Com(m) of m to a value other than m.
(2) Hiding: there exists a constant c < 1 s.t. the probability that a commitment Com(m) to m leaks
information about m to an adversary running in O(2λc) steps is no more than negl(λ).
(3) Additively homomorphic: ∀m1,m2, we have that Com(m1) · Com(m2) = Com(m1 +m2) .
2.3.2. Zero-knowledge Proofs. D-DEMOS’s security requires the election authority to show the
correctness of the election setup to the public without compromising privacy. We enable this kind of
verification with the use of zero-knowledge proofs. In a zero-knowledge proof, the prover is trying to
convince the verifier that a statement is true, without revealing any information about the statement
apart from the fact that it is true [Quisquater et al. 1990]. More specifically, we say an interactive
proof system has the honest-verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK) property if there exists a probabilistic
polynomial time simulator S that , for any given challenge, can output an accepting proof transcript
that is distributed indistinguishable to the real transcript between an honest prover and an honest ver-
ifier. Here, we adopt Chaum-Pedersen zero-knowledge proofs [Chaum and Pedersen 1993], which
belong in the special class of Σ protocols (i.e., 3-move public-coin special HVZK proofs), allowing
the Election Authority to show that the content inside each commitment is a valid option encoding.
2.3.3. Collision resistant hash functions. Given the security parameter λ ∈ N, we say that a hash
function h : {0, 1}∗ 7→ {0, 1}ℓ(λ), where ℓ(λ) is polynomial in λ, is (t, ǫ)-collision resistant if for
every adversary A running in time at most t, the probability of A finding two distinct preimages
m1 6= m2 such that h(m1) = h(m2) is less than ǫ. By the birthday attack, in order for h to be
(t, ǫ)-collision resistant, we necessitate that t2/2ℓ(λ) < ǫ. In this work, we use SHA-256 as the
instantiation of a (t, t2 · 2−256)-collision resistant hash function.
2.3.4. IND-CPA symmetric encryption schemes. We say that a symmetric encryption scheme SE
achieves (t, q, ǫ)-indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA), if for every ad-
versary A that (i) runs in time at most t, (ii) makes at most q encryption queries that are pairs of
messages (m0,1,m1,1), . . . , (m0,q,m1,q) and (iii) for every encryption query (m0,i,m1,i), it re-
ceives the encryption of mb,i, where b is the outcome of a coin-flip, it holds that
Adv
IND−CPA
SE
(A) :=
∣∣Pr[A outputs 1 | b = 1]− Pr[A outputs 1 | b = 0]∣∣ < ǫ ,
where by AdvIND−CPA
SE
(A) we denote the advantage of A. D-DEMOS applies AES-128-CBC$
encryption, for which a known safe conjecture is that AdvPRFAES−128(B) ≤ (t+129 · q+ q2) · 2−128,
so in our proofs we assume that AES-128-CBC$ is (t, q, (2t + 258 · q + 3q2) · 2−128)-IND-CPA
secure. For further details, we refer the reader to [Bellare and Rogaway 2005, Chapters 3 & 4].
2.3.5. Digital Signature Schemes. A digital signature system is said to be secure if it is exis-
tentially unforgeable under a chosen-message attack (EUF-CMA). Roughly speaking, this means
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: August 2016.
Distributed, End-to-end Verifiable, and Privacy-Preserving Internet Voting Systems A:5
that an adversary running in polynomial time and adaptively querying signatures for (polynomially
many) messages has no more than negl(λ) probability to forge a valid signature for a new message.
D-DEMOS/Async utilizes the standard the RSA signature scheme, which is EUF-CMA secure un-
der the factoring assumption.
3. RELATED WORK
3.1. Voting systems
Several end-to-end verifiable e-voting systems have been introduced, e.g. the
kiosk-based systems [Chaum et al. 2005; Fisher et al. 2006; Chaum et al. 2008;
Benaloh et al. 2013; Moran and Naor 2010] and the internet voting systems [Adida 2008;
Kutylowski and Zago´rski 2010; Zago´rski et al. 2013; Kiayias et al. 2015]. In all these works, the
Bulletin Board (BB ) is a single point of failure and has to be trusted.
Dini presents a distributed e-voting system, which however is not end-to-end verifi-
able [Dini 2003]. In [Culnane and Schneider 2014], there is a distributed BB implementation,
also handling vote collection, according to the design of the vVote end-to-end verifiable e-voting
system [Culnane et al. 2015], which in turn is an adaptation of the Preˆt a` Voter e-voting sys-
tem [Chaum et al. 2005]. In [Culnane and Schneider 2014], the proper operation of the BB dur-
ing ballot casting requires a trusted device for signature verification. In contrast, our vote collec-
tion subsystem is done so that correct execution of ballot casting can be “human verifiable”, i.e.,
by simply checking the validity of the obtained receipt. Additionally, our vote collection subsys-
tem in D-DEMOS/Async is fully asynchronous, always deciding with exactly n − f inputs, while
in [Culnane and Schneider 2014], the system uses a synchronous approach based on the FloodSet
algorithm from [Lynch 1996] to agree on a single version of the state.
DEMOS [Kiayias et al. 2015] is an end-to-end verifiable e-voting system, which introduces the
novel idea of extracting the challenge of the zero-knowledge proof protocols from the voters’ ran-
dom choices; we leverage this idea in our system too. However, DEMOS uses a centralized Election
Authority (EA), which maintains all secrets throughout the entire election procedure, collects votes,
produces the result and commits to verification data in the BB . Hence, the EA is a single point of
failure, and because it knows the voters’ votes, it is also a critical privacy vulnerability. In this work,
we address these issues by introducing distributed components for vote collection and result tabula-
tion, and we do not assume any trusted component during election. Additionally, DEMOS does not
provide any recorded-as-cast feedback to the voter, whereas our system includes such a mechanism.
Besides, DEMOS encodes the i-th option to N i−1, where N is greater than the total number of
voters, and this option encoding has to fit in the message space of commitments. Therefore, the size
of the underlying elliptic curve grows linearly with the number of options, which makes DEMOS
not scalable with respect to the number of options. In this work, we overcome this problem by using
a different scheme for option encoding commitments. Moreover, the zero-knowledge proofs in DE-
MOS have a big soundness error, and it decreases the effectiveness of zero-knowledge application;
whereas, in our work, we obtain nearly optimal overall zero-knowledge soundness.
Furthermore, none of the above works provide any performance evaluation results. Fi-
nally, [Appel 2011] outlines the difficulties in managing seals for kiosks and ballot boxes, sup-
porting our position towards the use of internet voting.
3.2. State Machine Replication
Castro et al. [Castro and Liskov 2002] introduce a practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant repli-
cated state machine protocol. In the last several years, several protocols for Byzantine
Fault Tolerant state machine replication have been introduced to improve performance
([Cowling et al. 2006; Kotla et al. 2007]), robustness ([Aublin et al. 2013; Clement et al. 2009b]),
or both ([Clement et al. 2009a; Aublin et al. 2015]). Our system does not use the state machine
replication approach to handle vote collection, as it would be inevitably more costly. Each of our
vote collection nodes can validate a voter’s requests on its own. In addition, we are able to pro-
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cess multiple different voters’ requests concurrently, without enforcing the total ordering inherent
in replicated state machines. Finally, we do not wish voters to use special client-side software to
access our system.
4. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
4.1. Problem Definition and Goals
We consider an election with a single question and m options, for a voter population of size n,
where voting takes place between a certain begin and end time (the voting hours), and each voter
may select a single option.
Our major goals in designing our voting system are three. 1) It has to be end-to-end verifiable,
so that anyone can verify the complete election process. Additionally, voters should be able to
outsource auditing to third parties, without revealing their voting choice. 2) It has to be fault-tolerant,
so that an attack on system availability and correctness is hard. 3) Voters should not have to trust the
terminals they use to vote, as such devices may be malicious. Instead, voters should be assured their
vote was recorded, without disclosing any information on how they voted to the malicious entity
controlling their device.
4.2. System overview
We employ an election setup component in our system, which we call the Election Authority (EA ),
to alleviate the voter from employing any cryptographic operations. The EA initializes all other
system components, and then gets immediately destroyed to preserve privacy. The Vote Collection
(VC ) subsystem collects the votes from the voters during election hours, and assures them their
vote was recorded-as-cast. Our Bulletin Board (BB ) subsystem, which is a public repository of all
election-related information, is used to hold all ballots, votes, and the result, either in encrypted or
plain form, allowing any party to read from the BB and verify the complete election process. The
VC subsystem uploads all votes to the BB at election end time. Finally, our design includes trustees,
who are persons entrusted with managing all actions needed until result tabulation and publication,
including all actions supporting end-to-end verifiability. Trustees hold the keys to uncover any in-
formation hidden in the BB , and we use threshold cryptography to make sure a malicious minority
cannot uncover any secrets or corrupt the process.
Our system starts with the EA generating initialization data for every component of our sys-
tem. The EA encodes each election option, and commits to it using a commitment scheme, as
described below. It encodes the i-th option as ~ei, a unit vector where the i-th element is 1 and the
remaining elements are 0. The commitment of an option encoding is a vector of (lifted) ElGamal
ciphertexts [El Gamal ] over elliptic curve, that element-wise encrypts a unit vector. Note that this
commitment scheme is also additively homomorphic, i.e., the commitment of ea + eb can be com-
puted by component-wise multiplying the corresponding commitments of ea and eb. The EA then
creates a votecode and a receipt for each option. Subsequently, the EA prepares one ballot for each
voter, with two functionally equivalent parts. Each part contains a list of options, along with their
corresponding vote codes and receipts. We consider ballot distribution to be outside the scope of this
paper, but we do assume ballots, after being produced by the EA , are distributed in a secure manner
to each voter; thus only each voter knows the vote codes listed in her ballot. We make sure vote
codes are not stored in clear form anywhere besides the voter’s ballot. We depict this interaction in
Figure 1.
Our VC subsystem collects the votes from the voters during election hours, by accepting up to
one vote code from each voter (see Figure 2). The EA initializes each VC node with the vote codes
and the receipts of the voters’ ballots. However, it hides the vote codes, using a simple commit-
ment scheme based on symmetric encryption of the plaintext along with a random salt value. This
way, each VC node can verify if a vote code is indeed part of a specific ballot, but cannot recover
any vote code until the voter actually chooses to disclose it. Additionally, we secret-share each re-
ceipt across all VC nodes using an (N − f,N)-VSS (verifiable secret-sharing) scheme with trusted
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D-DEMOS components interaction during initialization phase
Election
Authority
Election
Authority
Voter
Voter
Vote Collection
Subsystem
Vote Collection
Subsystem
Bulletin Board
Subsystem
Bulletin Board
Subsystem
Trustee
Trustee
Ballot
VC Initialization Data
BB Initialization Data
Trustee Initialization Data
EA gets destroyed
Fig. 1. High-level diagram of component interactions during system initialization. Each subsystem is a distributed system
of its own, but is depicted as a unified entity in this diagram for brevity.
dealer [Schneier 1996], making sure that a receipt can be recovered and posted back to the voter
only when a strong majority of VC nodes participates successfully in our voting protocol. With this
design, our system adheres to the following contract with the voters: Any honest voter who receives
a valid receipt from a Vote Collector node, is assured her vote will be published on the BB, and thus
it will be included in the election tally.
The voter selects one part of her ballot at random, and posts her selected vote code to one of the
VC nodes. When she receives a receipt, she compares it with the one on her ballot corresponding
to the selected vote code. If it matches, she is assured her vote was correctly recorded and will be
included in the election tally. The other part of her ballot, the one not used for voting, will be used for
auditing purposes. This design is essential for verifiability, in the sense that the EA cannot predict
which part a voter may use, and the unused part will betray a malicious EA with 12 probability per
audited ballot.
Our second distributed subsystem is the BB , which is a replicated service of isolated nodes. Each
BB node is initialized from the EA with vote codes and associated option encodings in committed
form (again, for vote code secrecy), and each BB node provides public access to its stored infor-
mation. At election end time, VC nodes run our Vote Set Consensus protocol, which guarantees all
VC nodes agree on a single set of voted vote codes. After agreement, each VC node uploads this
set to every BB node, which in turn publishes this set once it receives the same copy from enough
VC nodes (see Figure 3).
Our third distributed subsystem is a set of trustees, who are persons entrusted with man-
aging all actions needed after vote collection, until result tabulation and publication; this in-
cludes all actions supporting end-to-end verifiability. Secrets that may uncover information in the
BB are shared across trustees, making sure malicious trustees under a certain threshold cannot
uncover and disclose sensitive information. We use Pedersen’s Verifiable linear Secret Sharing
(VSS) [Pedersen 1991] to split the election data among the trustees. In a (k, n)-VSS, at least k
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D-DEMOS components interaction during voting
Voter
Voter
Vote Collector
Node 1
Vote Collector
Node 1
Vote Collector
Node 2
Vote Collector
Node 2
Vote Collector
Node 3
Vote Collector
Node 3
Vote Collector
Node 4
Vote Collector
Node 4
Election hours begin
Cast vote
Voting protocol messages
Receipt
Election hours end
Fig. 2. High-level diagram of component interactions during the voting phase. Message exchanges between VC nodes are
simplified for this diagram. In this diagram, there are 4 VC nodes, tolerating up to 1 fault.
shares are required to reconstruct the original data, and any collection of less than k shares leaks
no information about the original data. Moreover, Pedersen’s VSS is additively homomorphic, i.e.,
one can compute the share of a + b by adding the share of a and the share of b respectively. This
approach allows trustees to perform homomorphic “addition” on the option-encodings of cast vote
codes, and contribute back a share of the opening of the homomorphic “total”. Once enough trustees
upload their shares of the “total”, the election tally is uncovered and published at each BB node (see
Figure 4).
To ensure voter privacy, the system cannot reveal the content inside an option encoding com-
mitment at any point. However, a malicious EA might put an arbitrary value (say 9000 votes for
option 1) inside such a commitment, causing an incorrect tally result. To prevent this, we utilize the
Chaum-Pedersen zero-knowledge proof [Chaum and Pedersen 1993], allowing the EA to show that
the content inside each commitment is a valid option encoding, without revealing its actual content.
Namely, the prover uses Sigma OR proof to show that each ElGamal ciphertext encrypts either 0 or
1, and the sum of all elements in a vector is 1. Our zero knowledge proof is organized as follows.
First, the EA posts the initial part of the proofs on the BB . Second, during the election, each voter’s
A/B part choice is viewed as a source of randomness, 0/1, and all the voters’ choices are collected
and used as the challenge of our zero knowledge proof. Finally, the trustees will jointly produce the
final part of the proofs and post it on the BB before the opening of the tally. Hence, everyone can
verify those proofs on the BB . We omit the zero-knowledge proof components in this paper and
refer the interested reader to [Chaum and Pedersen 1993] for details.
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D-DEMOS components interaction during Vote Set Consensus
Vote
Collector
Node 1
Vote
Collector
Node 2
Vote
Collector
Node 3
Vote
Collector
Node 4
Bulletin
Board
Node 1
Bulletin
Board
Node 2
Bulletin
Board
Node 3
Vote
Collector
Node 1
Vote
Collector
Node 2
Vote
Collector
Node 3
Vote
Collector
Node 4
Bulletin
Board
Node 1
Bulletin
Board
Node 2
Bulletin
Board
Node 3
Election hours end
Vote Set
Consensus
Protocol
Vote Set
Consensus
Protocol
Vote Set
Consensus
Protocol
Vote Set Upload
(multicast)
Vote Set Upload
(multicast)
Vote Set Upload
(multicast)
Vote Set Upload
(multicast)
Fig. 3. High-level diagram of component interactions during the vote set consensus phase. 4 VC nodes and 3 BB nodes
are shown, where each subsystem tolerates 1 fault. “VSC” stands for “Vote Set Consensus”. After agreeing on a single Vote
Set S, each VC node uploads S to every BB node. Messages are simplified for this diagram.
Our design allows any voter to read information from the BB , combine it with her private ballot,
and verify her ballot was included in the tally. Additionally, any third-party auditor can read the
BB and verify the complete election process (see Figure 5). As the number of auditors increases,
the probability of election fraud going undetected diminishes exponentially. For example, even if
only 10 people audit, with each one having 12 probability of detecting ballot fraud, the probability
of ballot fraud going undetected is only 12
10
= 0.00097. Thus, even if the EA is malicious and,
e.g., tries to point all vote codes to a specific option, this faulty setup will be detected because of the
end-to-end verifiability of the complete system.
In this paper, we present two different versions of our voting system, with different performance
and security trade-offs. In the first version, called D-DEMOS/IC, Vote Set Consensus is realized by
an algorithm achieving Interactive Consistency, and thus requiring synchronization. The second ver-
sion, D-DEMOS/Async, uses an asynchronous binary consensus algorithm for Vote Set Consensus,
and thus is completely asynchronous. The performance trade-offs between the two are analyzed in
Section 6.2.
4.3. System and Threat Model
We assume a fully connected network, where each node can reach any other node with which it
needs to communicate. The network can drop, delay, duplicate, or deliver messages out of order.
However, we assume messages are eventually delivered, provided the sender keeps retransmitting
them. For all nodes, we make no assumptions regarding processor speeds.
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D-DEMOS components interaction toward  lt publication
Trustee
Trustee
Bulletin Board
Subsystem
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Voter
Voter
Vote Set Consensus fini
Dowload Vote Set related data
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Upload (partial or final) result
Obtain result
Fig. 4. High-level diagram of trustee interactions with the BB , towards result tabulation and publication. Trustees are more
than one, and interact with the BB in any order. The BB is a distributed system of its own, but is depicted as a unified entity
in this diagram for brevity.
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Read election transcript
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election process
Fig. 5. High-level diagram of the system auditing. Voters send Auditors audit-related data that does not violate the voter’s
privacy. Auditors in turn read from the BB and verify the complete election process. The BB is a distributed system of its
own, but is depicted as a unified entity in this diagram for brevity.
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We assume the EA sets up the election and is destroyed upon completion of the setup, as it does
not directly interact with the remaining components of the system, thus reducing the attack surface
of the privacy of the voting system as a whole. We also assume initialization data for every system
component is relayed to it via untappable channels. We assume the adversary does not have the
computational power to violate the security of any underlying cryptographic primitives. We place
no bound on the number of faulty nodes the adversary can coordinate, as long as the number of
malicious nodes of each subsystem is below its corresponding fault threshold. Let Nv, Nb, and Nt
be the number of VC nodes, BB nodes, and trustees respectively. The voters are denoted by Vℓ,
ℓ = 1, . . . , n.
For both versions of our system, we assume the clocks of VC nodes are synchronized with real
world time; this is needed to prohibit voters from casting votes outside election hours. For the
safety of D-DEMOS/Async version, we make no further timing assumptions. To ensure liveness, we
assume the adversary cannot delay communication between honest nodes above a certain threshold.
For the D-DEMOS/IC version, we use the IC,BC-RBB algorithm achieving Interactive Consis-
tency (IC) from [Diamantopoulos et al. 2015], which requires a single synchronization point after
the beginning of the algorithm. To accommodate this, we use the election-end time as the starting
point of IC, and additionally assume the adversary cannot cause clock drifts between VC nodes
also for safety, besides liveness. This is because lost messages in the first round of IC,BC-RBB are
considered failures of the sending node.
Formally, we assume that there exists a global clock variable Clock ∈ N, and that every VC node,
BB node and voter X is equipped with an internal clock variable Clock[X ] ∈ N. We define the
following two events on the clocks:
(i). The event Init(X) : Clock[X ]← Clock, that initializes a nodeX by synchronizing its internal
clock with the global clock.
(ii). The event Inc(i) : i← i+ 1, that causes some clock i to advance by one time unit.
The adversarial setting for A upon D-DEMOS is defined in Figure 6.
The adversarial setting.
(1) The EA initializes every VC node, BB node, trustee of the D-DEMOS system by running Init(·) in all
clocks for synchronization. Then, EA prepares the voters’ ballots and all the VC nodes’, BB nodes’,
and trustees’ initialization data. Finally, it forwards the ballots for ballot distribution to the voters Vℓ,
ℓ = 1, . . . , n.
(2) A corrupts a fixed subset of VC nodes, a fixed subset of BB nodes, and a fixed subset of trustees. In
addition, it defines a fixed subset of corrupt voters Vcorr.
(3) When an honest node X wants to transmit a message M to an honest node Y , then it just sends
(X,M, Y ) to A.
(4) A may arbitrarily invoke the events Inc(Clock) or Inc(Clock[X]), for any node X . Moreover, A may
write on the incoming network tape of any honest component node of D-DEMOS.
(5) For every voter Vℓ:
(a) If Vℓ ∈ Vcorr, then A fully controls Vℓ.
(b) If Vℓ /∈ Vcorr, then A may initialize Vℓ by running Init(Vℓ) only once. If this happens, then the
only control of A over Vℓ is Inc(Clock[Vℓ]) invocations. Upon initialization, Vℓ engages in the
voting protocol.
Fig. 6. The adversarial setting for the adversary A acting upon the distributed bulletin board system.
The description in Figure 6 poses no restrictions on the control the adversary has over all internal
clocks, or the number of nodes that it may corrupt (arbitrary denial of service attacks or full cor-
ruption of D-DEMOS nodes are possible). Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the model so that
we can perform a meaningful security analysis and prove the properties (liveness, safety, end-to-end
verifiability, and voter privacy) that D-DEMOS achieves. Namely, we require the following:
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A. FAULT TOLERANCE. We consider arbitrary (Byzantine) failures, because we expect our system
to be deployed across separate administrative domains. For each of the subsystems, we have the
following fault tolerance thresholds:
— The number of faulty VC nodes, fv, is strictly less than 1/3 of Nv , i.e., for fixed fv:
Nv ≥ 3fv + 1.
— The number of faulty BB nodes, fb, is strictly less than 1/2 of Nb , i.e., for fixed fb:
Nb ≥ 2fb + 1.
— For the trustees’ subsystem, we apply ht out-of Nt threshold secret sharing, where ht is the
number of honest trustees, thus we tolerate ft = Nt − ht malicious trustees.
B. BOUNDED SYNCHRONIZATION LOSS. For the liveness of D-DEMOS (both versions), all sys-
tem participants are aware of a value Tend such that for each nodeX , if Clock[X ] ≥ Tend, thenX
considers that the election has ended. In addition, the safety of D-DEMOS/IC version, assumes
two timing points, a starting point (that we set as Tend) and a barrier, denoted by Tbarrier, that
determine the beginning of the Value Dissemination phase and the transition to the Result Con-
sensus phase of the underlying Interactive Consistency protocol (see Section 2.2), respectively.
For the above reasons, we bound the drift on the nodes’ internal clocks, assuming an upper
bound ∆ of the drift of all honest nodes’ internal clocks with respect to the global clock. For-
mally, we have that: |Clock[X ]− Clock| ≤ ∆ for every node X , where | · | denotes the absolute
value.
C. BOUNDED COMMUNICATION DELAY. For the liveness of D-DEMOS (both versions) and the
safety of D-DEMOS/IC, we need to ensure eventual message delivery in bounded time. There-
fore, we assume that there exists an upper bound δ on the time that A can delay the delivery of
the messages between honest nodes. Formally, when the honest node X sends (X,M, Y ) to A,
if the value of the global clock is T , then A must write M on the incoming network tape of Y
by the time that Clock = T + δ. We note that δ should be a reasonably small value for liveness,
while for safety of D-DEMOS/IC it suffices to be dominated by the predetermined timeouts of
the VC nodes.
For clarity, we recap the aforementioned requirements in Fig. 7.
Requirement D-DEMOS/IC D-DEMOS/AsyncLiveness Safety Liveness Safety
Fault tolerance of the
VC subsystem X X X X
Fault tolerance of the
BB subsystem X X
Fault tolerance of the
trustees’ subsystem X X
Bounded
synchronization loss X X X
Bounded
communication
delay
X X X
Fig. 7. Requirements for the liveness and safety of D-DEMOS/IC and D-DEMOS/Async.
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4.4. Election Authority
EA produces the initialization data for each election entity in the setup phase. To enhance the system
robustness, we let the EA generate all the public/private key pairs for all the system components
(except voters) without relying on external PKI support. We use zero knowledge proofs to ensure
the correctness of all the initialization data produced by the EA .
4.4.1. Voter Ballots. The EA generates one ballot ballotℓ for each voter ℓ, and assigns a unique
64-bit serial-noℓ to it. As shown below, each ballot consists of two parts: Part A and Part B. Each
part contains a list of m 〈vote-code, option, receipt〉 tuples, one tuple for each election option. The
EA generates the vote-code as a 128-bit random number, unique within the ballot, and the receipt
as 64-bit random number.
serial-noℓ
Part A
vote-codeℓ,1 optionℓ,1 receiptℓ,1
. . . . . . . . .
vote-codeℓ,m optionℓ,m receiptℓ,m
Part B
vote-codeℓ,1 optionℓ,1 receiptℓ,1
. . . . . . . . .
vote-codeℓ,m optionℓ,m receiptℓ,m
4.4.2. BB initialization data. The initialization data for all BB nodes is identical, and each BB
node publishes its initialization data immediately. The BB ’s data is used to show the correspon-
dence between the vote codes and their associated cryptographic payload. This payload comprises
the committed option encodings, and their respective zero knowledge proofs of valid encoding (first
move of the prover), as described in section 4.2. However, the vote codes must be kept secret during
the election, to prevent the adversary from “stealing” the voters’ ballots and using the stolen vote
codes to vote. To achieve this, the EA first randomly picks a 128-bit key, msk, and encrypts each
vote-code using AES-128-CBC with random initialization vector (AES-128-CBC$) encryption, de-
noted as [vote-code]msk. Each BB node is givenHmsk ← SHA256(msk, saltmsk) and saltmsk, where
saltmsk is a fresh 64-bit random salt. Hence, each BB node can be assured the key it reconstructs
from VC key-shares (see below) is indeed the key that was used to encrypt these vote-codes.
The rest of the BB initialization data is as follows: for each serial-noℓ, and for each ballot part,
there is a shuffled list of
〈
[vote-codeℓ,πX
ℓ
(j)]msk, payloadℓ,πX
ℓ
(j)
〉
tuples, where πXℓ ∈ Sm is a
random permutation (X is A or B).
(Hmsk, saltmsk)
serial-noℓ
Part A
[vote-codeℓ,πA
ℓ
(1)]msk payloadℓ,πA
ℓ
(1)
.
.
.
.
.
.
[vote-codeℓ,πA
ℓ
(m)]msk payloadℓ,πA
ℓ
(m)
Part B
[vote-codeℓ,πB
ℓ
(1)]msk payloadℓ,πB
ℓ
(1)
.
.
.
.
.
.
[vote-codeℓ,πB
ℓ
(m)]msk payloadℓ,πB
ℓ
(m)
We shuffle the list of tuples of each part to ensure voter’s privacy. This way, nobody can guess the
voter’s choice from the position of the cast vote-code in this list.
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4.4.3. VC initialization data. The EA uses an (Nv − fv, Nv)-VSS (Verifiable Secret-Sharing)
scheme to split msk and every receiptℓ,j into Nv shares, denoted as (‖msk‖1, . . . , ‖msk‖Nv) and
(‖receiptℓ,j‖1, . . . , ‖receiptℓ,j‖Nv) respectively. For each vote-codeℓ,j in each ballot, the EA also
computes Hℓ,j ← SHA256(vote-codeℓ,j, saltℓ,j), where saltℓ,j is a 64-bit random number. Hℓ,j
allows each VC node to validate a vote-codeℓ,j individually (without network communication),
while still keeping the vote-codeℓ,j secret. To preserve voter privacy, these tuples are also shuffled
using πXℓ . The initialization data for V Ci is structured as below:
‖msk‖i
serial-noℓ
Part A
(Hℓ,πA
ℓ
(1), saltℓ,πA
ℓ
(1)) ‖receiptℓ,πA
ℓ
(1)‖i
. . . . . .
(Hℓ,πA
ℓ
(m), saltℓ,πA
ℓ
(m)) ‖receiptℓ,πA
ℓ
(m)‖i
Part B
(Hℓ,πB
ℓ
(1), saltℓ,πB
ℓ
(1)) ‖receiptℓ,πB
ℓ
(1)‖i
. . . . . .
(Hℓ,πB
ℓ
(m), saltℓ,πB
ℓ
(m)) ‖receiptℓ,πB
ℓ
(m)‖i
4.4.4. Trustee initialization data. The EA uses (ht, Nt)-VSS to split the opening of encoded op-
tion commitments Com(~ei) into Nt shares, denoted as (‖~ei‖1, . . . , ‖~ei‖Nt). The initialization data
for Trusteei is structured as below:
serial-noℓ
Part A
Com(~eπA
ℓ
(i)) ‖~eπA
ℓ
(i)‖ℓ
· · · · · ·
Part B
Com(~eπB
ℓ
(i)) ‖~eπB
ℓ
(i)‖ℓ
· · · · · ·
Similarly, the state of zero knowledge proofs for ballot correctness is shared among
the trustees using (ht, Nt)-VSS. For further details, we refer the interested reader
to [Chaum and Pedersen 1993].
4.5. Vote Collectors
The Vote Collection subsystem comprises Nv nodes that collect the votes from the voters and, at
election end time, agree on a single set of cast vote codes and upload it to the Bulletin Board. In the
following subsections, we present two different versions of the VC subsystem, one with a timing
assumption (D-DEMOS/IC) and one fully asynchronous (D-DEMOS/Async).
4.5.1. Vote Collectors for D-DEMOS/IC. VC is a distributed system of Nv nodes, running our
voting and vote-set consensus protocols. VC nodes have private and authenticated channels to each
other, and a public (unsecured) channel for voters. The algorithms implementing our D-DEMOS/IC
voting protocol are presented in Algorithm 1. For simplicity, we present our algorithms operating
for a single election.
The voting protocol starts when a voter submits a VOTE〈serial-no, vote-code〉 message to a VC
node. We call this node the responder, as it is responsible for delivering the receipt to the voter. The
VC node confirms the current system time is within the defined election hours, and locates the ballot
with the specified serial-no. It also verifies this ballot has not been used for this election, either with
the same or a different vote code. Then, it compares the vote-code against every hashed vote code
in each ballot line, until it locates the correct entry. Subsequently, it obtains from its local database
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: August 2016.
Distributed, End-to-end Verifiable, and Privacy-Preserving Internet Voting Systems A:15
the receipt-share corresponding to the specific vote-code. Next, it marks the ballot as pending for
the specific vote-code. Finally, it multicasts a VOTE P〈serial-no, vote-code, receipt-share〉 message
to all VC nodes, disclosing its share of the receipt. In case the located ballot is marked as voted
for the specific vote-code, the VC node sends the stored receipt to the voter without any further
interaction with other VC nodes.
Each VC node that receives a VOTE P message, first validates the received receipt-share
according to the verifiable secret sharing scheme used. Then, it performs the same validations as the
responder, and multicasts another VOTE P message (only once), disclosing its share of the receipt.
When a node collects hv = Nv− fv valid shares, it uses the verifiable secret sharing reconstruction
algorithm to reconstruct the receipt (the secret) and marks the ballot as voted for the specific
vote-code. Additionally, the responder node sends this receipt back to the voter. A message flow
diagram of our voting protocol is depicted in Figure 8. As is evident from the diagram, the time
from the multicast of the first VOTE P message until collecting all receipt shares, is only slightly
longer than a single round-trip between two VC nodes.
Fig. 8. Diagram of message exchanges for a single vote during the D-DEMOS/IC vote collection phase.
At election end time, each VC node stops processing VOTE and VOTE P messages, and initiates
the vote-set consensus protocol. It creates a set V Si of 〈serial-no, vote-code〉 tuples, including
all voted and pending ballots. Then, it participates in the Interactive Consistency (IC) protocol
of [Diamantopoulos et al. 2015], with this set. At the end of IC, each node contains a vector
〈V S1, . . . , V Sn〉 with the Vote Set of each node, and follows the algorithm of Figure 9. Step 1
Cross-tabulate 〈V S1, . . . , V Sn〉 per ballot, creating a list of vote codes for each ballot. Perform the
following actions for each ballot:
(1) If the list contains two or more distinct vote codes, mark the ballot as NotVoted and exit.
(2) If a vote code vca appears at least Nv − 2fv times in the list, mark the ballot as Voted for vca and
exit.
(3) Otherwise, mark the ballot as NotVoted and exit.
Fig. 9. High level description of algorithm after IC.
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makes sure any ballot with multiple submitted vote codes is discarded. Since vote codes are private,
and cannot be guessed by malicious vote collectors, the only way for multiple vote codes to appear
is if malicious voters are involved, against whom our system is not obliged to respect our contract.
With a single vote code remaining, step 2 considers the threshold above which to consider a
ballot as voted for a specific vote code. We select the Nv − 2fv threshold for which we are certain
that even the following extreme scenario is handled. If the responder is malicious, submits a receipt
to an honest voter, but denies it during vote-set consensus, the remaining Nv − 2fv honest VC
nodes that revealed their receipt shares for the generation of the receipt, are enough for the system
to accept the vote code (receipt generation requires Nv − fv nodes, of which fv may be malicious,
thus Nv − 2fv are necessarily honest).
Finally, step 3 makes sure vote codes that occur less than Nv − 2fv times are discarded. Under
this threshold, there is no way a receipt was ever generated.
At the end of this algorithm, each node submits the resulting set of voted 〈serial-no, vote-code〉
tuples to each BB node, which concludes its operation for the specific election.
Algorithm 1 Vote Collector algorithms for D-DEMOS/IC
1: procedure ON VOTE(serial-no, vote-code) from source:
2: if SysT ime() between start and end
3: b :=locateBallot(serial-no)
4: if b.status == NotVoted
5: l := ballot.VerifyVoteCode(vote-code)
6: if l 6= null
7: b.status := Pending
8: b.used-vc := vote-code
9: b.lrs := {} ⊲ list of receipt shares
10: sendAll(VOTE P〈serial-no, vote-code, l.share〉)
11: wait for (Nv − fv) VOTE P messages, fill b.lrs
12: b.receipt := Rec(b.lrs)
13: b.status := Voted
14: send(source, b.receipt)
15: else if b.status == Voted AND b.used-vc == vote-code
16: send (source, ballot.receipt)
17: procedure ON VOTE P(serial-no, vote-code, share) from source:
18: if SysT ime() between start and end
19: b :=locateBallot(serial-no)
20: if b.status == NotVoted
21: l := ballot.VerifyVoteCode(vote-code)
22: if l 6= null
23: b.status := Pending
24: b.used-vc := vote-code
25: b.lrs.Append(share)
26: sendAll(VOTE P(serial-no, vote-code, l.share) )
27: else if b.status == Voted AND b.used-vc == vote-code
28: b.lrs.Append(share)
29: if size(b.lrs) >= Nv − fv
30: b.receipt := Rec(b.lrs)
31: b.status := Voted
32: function BALLOT::VERIFYVOTECODE(vote-code)
33: for l = 1 to ballot lines do
34: if lines[l].hash == h(vote-code||lines[l].salt) return l
return null
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4.5.2. Vote Collectors for D-DEMOS/Async. We make the following enhancements to the Vote
Collection subsystem, to achieve the completely asynchronous version D-DEMOS/Async. During
voting we introduce another step, which guarantees only a single vote code can be accepted (towards
producing a receipt) for a given ballot. We also employ an asynchronous binary consensus primitive
to achieve Vote Set Consensus.
More specifically, during voting, the responder VC node validates the submitted vote code, but
before disclosing its receipt share, it multicasts an ENDORSE〈serial-no, vote-code〉 message to all
VC nodes. Each VC node, after making sure it has not endorsed another vote code for this ballot,
responds with an ENDORSEMENT〈serial-no, vote-code, sigVCi〉 message, where sigVCi is a digital
signature of the specific serial-no and vote-code, with V Ci’s private key. The responder collects
Nv− fv valid signatures and forms a uniqueness certificate UCERT for this ballot. It then discloses
its receipt share via the VOTE P message, but also attaches the formed UCERT in the message.
Each VC node that receives a VOTE P message, first verifies the validity of UCERT and discards
the message on error. On success, it proceeds as per the D-DEMOS/IC protocol (validating the
receipt share it receives and then disclosing its own receipt share).
The algorithms implementing our D-DEMOS/Async voting protocol are presented in Algorithm 2.
The voting process is outlined in the diagram of Figure 10, where we now see two round-trips are
needed before the receipt is reconstructed and posted to the voter.
Fig. 10. Diagram of message exchanges for a single vote during the D-DEMOS/Async vote collection phase.
The formation of a valid UCERT gives our algorithms the following guarantees:
a) No matter how many responders and vote codes are active at the same time for the same ballot, if
a UCERT is formed for vote code vca, no other uniqueness certificate for any vote code different
than vca can be formed.
b) By verifying the UCERT before disclosing a VC node’s receipt share, we guarantee the voter’s
receipt cannot be reconstructed unless a valid UCERT is present.
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At election end time, each VC node stops processing ENDORSE, ENDORSEMENT, VOTE and
VOTE P messages, and follows the vote-set consensus algorithm in Figure 11, for each registered
ballot.
(1) Send ANNOUNCE〈serial-no, vote-code,UCERT〉 to all nodes. The vote-code will be null if the node
knows of no vote code for this ballot.
(2) Wait for Nv − fv such messages. If any of these messages contains a valid vote code vca, accompa-
nied by a valid UCERT, change the local state immediately, by setting vca as the vote code used for
this ballot.
(3) Participate in a Binary Consensus protocol, with the subject “Is there a valid vote code for this
ballot?”. Enter with an opinion of 1, if a valid vote code is locally known, or a 0 otherwise.
(4) If the result of Binary Consensus is 0, consider the ballot not voted.
(5) Else, if the result of Binary Consensus is 1, consider the ballot voted. There are two sub-cases here:
a) If vote code vca, accompanied by a valid UCERT is locally known, consider the ballot voted for
vca.
b) If, however, vca is not known, send a RECOVER-REQUEST〈serial-no〉 message to all VC nodes,
wait for the first valid RECOVER-RESPONSE〈serial-no, vca,UCERT〉 response, and update the
local state accordingly.
Fig. 11. High level description of algorithm for asynchronous vote set consensus.
Steps 1-2 ensure used vote codes are dispersed across nodes. Recall our receipt generation re-
quires Nv − fv shares to be revealed by distinct VC nodes, of which at least Nv − 2fv are honest.
Note that any two Nv − fv subsets of Nv have at least one honest node in common. Because of
this, if a receipt was generated, at least one honest node’s ANNOUNCE will be processed by every
honest node, and all honest VC nodes will obtain the corresponding vote code in these two steps.
Consequently, all honest nodes enter step 3 with an opinion of 1 and binary consensus is guaranteed
to deliver 1 as the resulting value, thus safeguarding our contract against the voters. In any case,
step 3 guarantees all VC nodes arrive at the same conclusion, on whether this ballot is voted or not.
In the algorithm outlined above, the result from binary consensus is translated from 0/1 to a status
of “not-voted” or a unique valid vote code, in steps 4-5. The 5b case of this translation, in particular,
requires additional explanation. Assume, for example, that a voter submitted a valid vote code vca,
but a receipt was not generated before election end time. In this case, an honest vote collector node
V Ci may not be aware of vca at step 3, as steps 1-2 do not make any guarantees in this case. Thus,
V Ci may rightfully enter consensus with a value of 0. However, when honest nodes’ opinions are
mixed, the consensus algorithm may produce any result. In case the result is 1, V Ci will not possess
the correct vote code vca, and thus will not be able to properly translate the result. This is what
our recovery sub-protocol is designed for. V Ci will issue a RECOVER-REQUEST multicast, and
we claim that another honest node, V Ch exists that possesses vca and replies with it. The reason
for the existence of an honest V Ch is straightforward and stems from the properties of the binary
consensus problem definition. If all honest nodes enter binary consensus with the same opinion a,
the result of any consensus algorithm is guaranteed to be a. Since we have an honest node V Ci, that
entered consensus with a value of 0, but a result of 1 was produced, there has to exist another honest
node V Ch that entered consensus with an opinion of 1. Since V Ch is honest, it must possess vca,
along with the corresponding UCERT (as no other vote code vcb can be active at the same time for
this ballot). Again, because V Ch is honest, it will follow the protocol and reply with a well formed
RECOVER-REPLY. Additionally, the existence of UCERT guarantees that any malicious replies
can be safely identified and discarded.
As per D-DEMOS/IC, at the end of this algorithm, each node submits the resulting set of voted
〈serial-no, vote-code〉 tuples to each BB node, which concludes its operation for the specific elec-
tion.
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Algorithm 2 Vote Collector algorithms for D-DEMOS/Async
1: procedure ON VOTE(serial-no, vote-code) from source:
2: if SysT ime() between start and end
3: b :=locateBallot(serial-no)
4: if b.status == NotVoted
5: l := ballot.VerifyVoteCode(vote-code)
6: if l 6= null
7: b.UCERT := {} ⊲ Uniqueness certificate
8: sendAll(ENDORSE〈serial-no, vote-code〉)
9: wait for (Nv − fv) valid replies, fill b.UCERT
10: b.status := Pending
11: b.used-vc := vote-code
12: b.lrs := {} ⊲ list of receipt shares
13: sendAll(VOTE P〈serial-no, vote-code, l.share〉)
14: wait for (Nv − fv) VOTE P messages, fill b.lrs
15: b.receipt := Rec(b.lrs)
16: b.status := Voted
17: send(source, b.receipt)
18: else if b.status == Voted AND b.used-vc == vote-code
19: send (source, ballot.receipt)
20: procedure ON VOTE P(serial-no, vote-code, share,UCERT) from source:
21: if UCERT is not valid
22: return
23: if SysT ime() between start and end
24: b :=locateBallot(serial-no)
25: if b.status == NotVoted
26: l := ballot.VerifyVoteCode(vote-code)
27: if l 6= null
28: b.status := Pending
29: b.used-vc := vote-code
30: b.lrs.Append(share)
31: sendAll(VOTE P(serial-no, vote-code, l.share) )
32: else if b.status == Voted AND b.used-vc == vote-code
33: b.lrs.Append(share)
34: if size(b.lrs) >= Nv − fv
35: b.receipt := Rec(b.lrs)
36: b.status := Voted
37: function BALLOT::VERIFYVOTECODE(vote-code)
38: for l = 1 to ballot lines do
39: if lines[l].hash == h(vote-code||lines[l].salt) return l
return null
4.6. Voter
We expect the voter, who has received a ballot from EA , to know the URLs of at least fv + 1
VC nodes. To vote, she picks one part of the ballot at random, selects the vote code representing
her chosen option, and loops, selecting a VC node at random and posting the vote code, until she
receives a valid receipt. After the election, the voter can verify two things from the updated BB .
First, she can verify her cast vote code is included in the tally set. Second, she can verify that the
unused part of her ballot, as “opened” at the BB , matches the copy she received before the election
started. This step verifies that the vote codes are associated with the expected options as printed in
the ballot. Finally, the voter can delegate both of these checks to an auditor, without sacrificing her
privacy. This is because the cast vote code does not reveal her choice, and because the unused part
of the ballot is completely unrelated to the used one.
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4.7. Bulletin Board
A BB node functions as a public repository of election-specific information. By definition, it can be
read via a public and anonymous channel. Writes, on the other hand, happen over an authenticated
channel, implemented with PKI originating from the voting system. BB nodes are independent from
each other, as a BB node never directly contacts another BB node. Readers are expected to issue
a read request to all BB nodes, and trust the reply that comes from the majority. Writers are also
expected to write to all BB nodes; their submissions are always verified, and explained in more
detail below.
After the setup phase, each BB node publishes its initialization data. During election hours, BB
nodes remain inert. After the voting phase, each BB node receives from each VC node, the final
vote-code set and the shares of msk. Once it receives fv +1 identical final vote code sets, it accepts
and publishes the final vote code set. Once it receives Nv − fv valid key shares (again from VC
nodes), it reconstructs the msk, decrypts all the encrypted vote codes in its initialization data, and
publishes them.
At this point, the cryptographic payloads corresponding to the cast vote codes are made available
to the trustees. Trustees, in turn, read from the BB subsystem, perform their individual calculations
and then write to the BB nodes; these writes are verified by the trustees’ keys, generated by the EA .
Once enough trustees have posted valid data, the BB node combines them and publishes the final
election result.
We intentionally designed our BB nodes to be as simple as possible for the reader, refraining from
using a Replicated State Machine, which would require readers to run algorithm-specific software.
The robustness of BB nodes comes from controlling all write accesses to them. Writes from VC
nodes are verified against their honest majority threshold. Further writes are allowed only from
trustees, verified by their keys.
Finally, a reader of our BB nodes should post her read request to all nodes, and accept what
the majority responds with (fb + 1 is enough). We acknowledge there might be temporary state
divergence (among BB nodes), from the time a writer updates the first BB node, until the same
writer updates the last BB node. However, given our thresholds, this should be only momentary,
alleviated with simple retries. Thus, if there is no reply backed by a clear majority, the reader should
retry until there is one.
4.8. Trustees
After the end of election hours, each trustee fetches all the election data from the BB subsystem
and verifies its validity. For each ballot, there are two possible valid outcomes: i) one of the A/B
parts are voted, ii) none of the A/B parts are voted. If both A/B parts of a ballot are marked as voted,
then the ballot is considered as invalid and is discarded. Similarly, trustees also discard those ballots
where more than one commitments in an A/B part are marked as voted.
In case (i), for each encoded option commitment in the unused part, Trusteeℓ submits its corre-
sponding share of the opening of the commitment to the BB . For each encoded option commitment
in the voted part, Trusteeℓ computes and posts the share of the final message of the corresponding
zero knowledge proof, showing the validity of those commitments. Meanwhile, those commitments
marked as voted are collected to a tally set Etally. In case (ii), for each encoded option commit-
ment in both parts, Trusteeℓ submits its corresponding share of the opening of the commitment to
the BB . Finally, denote D(ℓ)tally as Trusteeℓ’s set of shares of option encoding commitment open-
ings, corresponding to the commitments in Etally. Trusteeℓ computes the opening share for Esum
as Tℓ =
∑
D∈D
(ℓ)
tally
and then submits Tℓ to each BB node.
4.9. Auditors
Auditors are participants of our system who can verify the election process. The role of the auditor
can be assumed by voters or any other party. After election end time, auditors read information from
the BB and verify the correct execution of the election, by verifying the following:
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(1) within each opened ballot, no two vote codes are the same;
(2) there are no two submitted vote codes associated with any single ballot part;
(3) within each ballot, no more than one part has been used;
(4) all the openings of the commitments are valid;
(5) all the zero-knowledge proofs associated with the used ballot parts are completed and valid.
In case they received audit information (an unused ballot part and a cast vote code) from voters who
wish to delegate verification, they can also verify:
(6) the submitted vote codes are consistent with the ones received from the voters;
(7) the openings of the unused ballot parts are consistent with the ones received from the voters.
5. POTENTIAL ATTACKS
In this section, we outline some of the possible attacks against the D-DEMOS systems, and the way
our systems thwart them. This is a high level discussion, aiming to help the reader understand why
our systems work reliably. In Appendix A, we provide the formal proofs of correctness and privacy,
which are the foundation of this discussion.
In this high-level description, we intentionally do not focus on Denial-of-Service attacks, as these
kind of attacks attempt to stop the system from producing a result, or stop voters from casting their
votes. Although these attacks are important, they cannot be hidden, as voters will notice immediately
the system not responding (either because of our receipt mechanism and our liveness property, or
because of lack of information in the BB ). Instead, we focus on attacks on the correctness of the
election result, as these have consequences simple voters cannot identify easily. In this discussion,
we assume the fault thresholds of section 4.3 are not violated, and the attacker cannot violate the
security of the underlying cryptographic primitives.
In this section, we focus on correctness, noting that our systems’ privacy is achieved by the secu-
rity of our cryptographic schemes (see Sections 2.3 and A.4 for details), and the partial initialization
data that each node of the distributed subsystems receives at the setup phase.
5.1. Malicious Election Authority Component
At a high level, the EA produces vote codes and corresponding receipts. Vote codes are pointers
to the associated cryptographic payload, which includes option encodings. Options encodings are
used to produce the tally using homomorphic addition. If the EA miss-encodes any option, it will
be identified by the Zero-Knowledge proof validation performed by the Auditors.
The EA may instead try to “point” a vote code to a valid but different option encoding (than
the one described in the voter’s ballot), in an attempt to manipulate the result. In this case, the EA
cannot predict which one of the two parts the voter will use. Recall that the unused part of the ballot
will be opened in the BB by the trustees, and thus the voters can read and verify the correctness of
their unused ballot parts.
As explained in detail in section A.3, if none of the above attacks take place, there is perfect
consistency between each voter’s ballot and its corresponding information on the BB . Because of
this, as well as the correctness and the perfect hiding property of our commitment scheme, the
homomorphic tally will be opened to the actual election result.
5.2. Malicious Voter
A malicious voter can try to submit multiple vote codes to the VC subsystem, attempting to cause
disagreement between its nodes. In this case, a receipt may be generated, depending on the order
of delivery of network messages. Note that, our safety contract allows our system to either accept
only one vote code for this ballot, or discard the ballot altogether, as the voter is malicious and our
contract holds only against honest voters.
In the D-DEMOS/IC case, this is resolved at the Vote Set Consensus phase. During the voting
phase, each VC node accepts only the first vote code it receives (via either a VOTE or a VOTE P
message), and attempts to follow our voting protocol. This results in the generation of at most one
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receipt, for one of the posted vote codes. However, during Vote Set Consensus, honest VC nodes will
typically identify the multiple posted vote codes and discard the ballot altogether, even if a receipt
was indeed generated. If the ballot is not discarded (e.g., because malicious vote collector nodes hid
the extra vote codes and honest nodes knew only of one), our Nv − 2fv threshold guarantees that
no vote codes with generated receipts are discarded.
In the D-DEMOS/Async case, this is resolved completely at the voting phase. Each VC node still
accepts only the first vote code it receives, but additionally attempts to build a UCERT for it. As
the generation of a UCERT is guaranteed to be successful only for a single vote code, the outcome
of the voting protocol will be either no UCERT being built, resulting in considering the ballot as
not-voted, or a single UCERT generated.
Thus, the two systems behave differently in the case of multiple posted vote codes, as D-
DEMOS/IC typically discards such ballots, while D-DEMOS/Async may process some of them,
when a UCERT is successfully built.
5.3. Malicious Vote Collector
A malicious VC node cannot easily guess the vote codes in the voters’ ballots, as they are randomly
generated. Additionally, because vote codes are encrypted in the local state of each VC node, the
latter cannot decode and use them. Note that, a vote code in a voter’s ballot is considered private
until the voter decides to use it and transmits it over the network. From this point on, the vote code
can be intercepted by the attacker, as the only power it gives him is to cast it.
A malicious VC node can obtain vote codes from colluding malicious voters. In this case, the
only possible attack on correctness is exactly the same as if it originated from the malicious voter
herself, and we already described our counter-measures in Section 5.2.
A malicious VC node may become a responder. In this case, this VC node may selectively
transmit the cast vote code to a subset of the remaining VC nodes, potentially including all the
other malicious and colluding nodes, and deliver the receipt to an honest voter. Consequently, the
attacker controlling the malicious entities, may try to “confuse” the honest VC nodes and have
them disagree on whether the ballot is voted or not, by having all malicious VC nodes lie at vote set
consensus time, reporting the ballot as not voted.
Recall that, for the receipt to be generated, Nv − fv VC nodes need to cooperate, of which up to
fv may be malicious. This leaves Nv − 2fv honest nodes always present.
In the case of D-DEMOS/IC, these Nv − 2fv honest nodes will show up in the per ballot cross-
tabulation, and will drive the decision to mark the ballot as voted (note that, in the algorithm of
Figure 9, Nv − 2fv is the lower threshold for a ballot to be marked as voted). In the case of D-
DEMOS/Async, we include the ANNOUNCE-exchanging phase before the consensus algorithm, to
guarantee at least one of the Nv − 2fv honest nodes’ ANNOUNCE message will be processed by
every honest node. In this case, all honest nodes will agree on entering consensus that the ballot is
voted, which guarantees the outcome of consensus to be in accordance.
5.4. Malicious BB nodes and trustees
Malicious entities between both the BB nodes and the trustees cannot influence the security of
both systems. The reason is, a node of each of these two subsystems does not communicate with
the remaining nodes of the same subsystem, and thus cannot influence either the correctness, or
progress of the system as a whole.
6. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
6.1. Implementation
Voting system: We implement the Election Authority component of our system as a standalone
C++ application, and all other components in Java. Whenever we store data structures on disk,
or transmit them over the network, we use Google Protocol Buffers [Inc. 2015] to encode and de-
code them efficiently. We use the MIRACL library [MIRACL 2015] for elliptic-curve cryptographic
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operations. In all applications requiring a database, we use the PostgreSQL relational database sys-
tem [community 2015b].
We build an asynchronous communications stack (ACS) on top of Java, using
Netty [community 2015a] and the asynchronous PostgreSQL driver from [Laisi 2015], using
TLS based authenticated channels for inter-node communication, and a public HTTP channel for
public access. This infrastructure uses connection-oriented sockets, but allows the applications
running on the upper layers to operate in a message-oriented fashion. We use this infrastructure to
implement VC and BB nodes. We implement “verifiable secret sharing with honest dealer”, by
utilizing Shamir’s Secret Share library implementation [Tiemens 2015], and having the EA sign
each share.
For D-DEMOS/IC, we use the implementation of IC,BC-RBB (Interactive Consistency al-
gorithm, using asynchronous binary consensus and reliable broadcast without signatures)
from [Diamantopoulos et al. 2015]. We use the election end time as a synchronization point to start
the algorithm, and configure the timeout of the first phase of the algorithm according to the number
of VC nodes and the number of ballots in the election.
For D-DEMOS/Async, we implement Bracha’s Binary Consensus directly on top of the ACS, and
we use that to implement our Vote Set Consensus algorithm (depicted in Figure 11). We introduce a
version of Binary Consensus that operates in batches of arbitrary size; this way, we achieve greater
network efficiency.
Additionally, we batch most of the asynchronous vote set consensus “announce” phase’s mes-
sages. If this phase was implemented without optimization, it would result in a message complexity
of n∗Nv (individual ANNOUNCE messages), imposing a significant network load. This is because
each node has to multicast an ANNOUNCE message for each ballot, and wait for n(Nv − fv) replies
to progress. To optimize it, we have each node consult its local database and diagnose cases where
another node already knows the correct vote code and UCERT for a specific ballot. This is feasible
because when a node V Cb discloses its share using the VOTE P message, it also includes the
UCERT, and this fact is recorded in the recipient’s node (V Ca) database along with the sender
node’s share. For these cases, we produce ANNOUNCE RANGE messages addressed to individual
nodes, having the source node V Ca announce a range of ballot serial numbers as voted, a fact that
is already known to the recipient node V Cb (because V Ca located recorded VOTE P messages
from V Cb). We use the same mechanism to announce ranges of not-voted ballots.
Trustee Android application: In addition to the web interface for trustees, we also implement a
specialized Trustee Android application. We re-use the MIRACL library on Android and provide
a simple user interface for trustees, where they use a single button press to perform each of their
required tasks: download their initialization data from the EA , download election data from the
BB , calculate their cryptographic contribution to the result opening, and finally upload their share
of the opening to the BB .
Web browser replicated service reader: Our choice to model the Bulletin Board as a replicated
service of non-cooperating nodes puts the burden of response verification on the reader of the ser-
vice; a human reader is expected to manually issue a read request to all nodes, then compare the
responses and pick the one posted by the majority of nodes. To alleviate this burden, we implement a
web browser extension which automates this task, as an extension for Mozilla Firefox. The user sets
up the list of URLs for the replicated service. The add-on 1) intercepts any HTTP request towards
any of these URLs, 2) issues the same request to the rest of the nodes, and 3) captures the responses,
compares them in binary form, and routes the response coming from the majority, as a response to
the original request posted by the user. Majority is defined by the number of defined URL prefixes;
for 3 such URLs, the first 2 equal replies suffice.
With the above approach, the user never sees a wrong reply, as it is filtered out by the extension.
Also note this process will be repeated for all dependencies of the initial web page (images, scripts,
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Fig. 12. Vote collection throughput graphs for D-DEMOS/IC (12a) and D-DEMOS/Async(12b), versus the number of total
election ballots n.
CSS), as long at they come from the same source (with the same URL prefix), verifying the complete
user visual experience in the browser.
Note that, this mechanism is required only when reading data from the Bulletin Board, such as
the election result, or audit information. This mechanism is neither needed nor used during voting,
where the voter interacts with the Vote Collection subsystem using our voting protocol.
6.2. Evaluation
We experimentally evaluate the performance of our voting system, focusing mostly on our vote
collection algorithm, which is the most performance critical part. We conduct our experiments using
a cluster of 12 machines, connected over a Gigabit Ethernet switch. The first 4 are equipped with
Hexa-core Intel Xeon E5-2420 @ 1.90GHz, 16GB RAM, and one 1TB SATA disk, running CentOS
7 Linux, and we use them to run our VC nodes. The remaining 8 comprise dual Intel(R) Xeon(TM)
CPUs @ 2.80GHz, with 4GB of main memory, and two 50GB disks, running CentOS 6 Linux, and
we use them as clients.
We implement a multi-threaded voting client to simulate concurrency. This client starts the re-
quested number of threads, each of which loads its corresponding ballots from disk and waits for
a signal to start. From then on, the thread enters a loop where it picks one VC node and vote code
at random, requests the voting page from the selected VC (HTTP GET), submits its vote (HTTP
POST), and waits for the reply (receipt). This simulates multiple concurrent voters casting their
votes in parallel, and gives an understanding of the behavior of the system under the corresponding
load. We employ the PostgreSQL RDBMS [community 2015b] to store all VC initialization data
from the EA .
We start off by demonstrating our system’s capability of handling large-scale elections. To this
end, we generate election data for referendums, i.e., m = 2, and vary the total number of ballots
n from 50 million to 250 million (note the 2012 US voting population size was 235 million). This
causes the database size to increase accordingly and impact queries. We fix the number of concurrent
clients to 400 and cast a total of 200,000 ballots, which are enough for our system to reach its steady-
state operation (larger experiments result in the same throughput). Figure 12 shows the throughput
of both D-DEMOS/IC and D-DEMOS/Async declines slowly, even with a five-fold increase in the
number of eligible voters. The cause of the decline is the increase of the database size.
In our second experiment, we explore the effect of m, i.e., the number of election options, on
system performance. We vary the number of options from m = 2 to m = 10. Each election has a
total of n = 200, 000 ballots which we spread evenly across 400 concurrent clients. As illustrated
in Figure 13, our vote collection protocol manages to deliver approximately the same throughput
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Fig. 13. Vote collection throughput graphs for D-DEMOS/IC (13a) and D-DEMOS/Async(13b), versus the number of
election options m.
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Fig. 14. Vote Collection response time of D-DEMOS/IC (14a) and D-DEMOS/Async (14b), versus the number of VC
nodes, under a LAN setting. Election parameters are n = 200,000 and m = 4.
regardless of the value of m, for both D-DEMOS/IC and D-DEMOS/Async. Notice that the major
extra overhead m induces during vote collection, is the increase in the number of hash verifications
during vote code validation, as there are more vote codes per ballot. The increase in number of
options has a minor impact on the database size as well (as each ballots has 2m options).
Next, we evaluate the scalability of our vote collection protocol by varying the number of vote
collectors and concurrent clients. We eliminate the database, by caching the election data in memory
and servicing voters from the cache, to measure the net communication and processing costs of
our voting protocol. We vary the number of VC nodes from 4 to 16, and distribute them across
the 4 physical machines. Note that, co-located nodes are unable to produce vote receipts via local
messages only, since the Nv − fv threshold cannot be satisfied, i.e., cross-machine communication
is still the dominant factor in receipt generation. For election data, we use the dataset with n =
200, 000 ballots and m = 4 options, which is enough for our system to reach its steady state.
In Figure 14, we plot the average response time of both our vote collection protocols, versus the
number of vote collectors, under different concurrency levels, ranging from 500 to 2000 concurrent
clients. Results for both systems illustrate an almost linear increase in the client-perceived latency,
for all concurrency scenarios, up to 13 VC nodes. From this point on, when four logical VC nodes
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Fig. 15. Vote Collection throughput of D-DEMOS/IC (15a) and D-DEMOS/Async (15b), versus the number of VC nodes,
under a LAN setting. Election parameters are n = 200,000 and m = 4.
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Fig. 16. Vote Collection throughput of D-DEMOS/IC (16a) and D-DEMOS/Async (16b), versus the number of concurrent
clients, under a LAN setting. Plots illustrate performance for different cardinalities of VC nodes, thus different fault tolerance
settings. Election parameters are n = 200,000 and m = 4.
are placed on a single physical machine, we notice a non-linear increase in latency. We attribute
this to the overloading of the memory bus, a resource shared among all processors of the system,
which services all (in-memory) database operations. D-DEMOS/IC has a slower response time with
its single round intra-VC node communication, while D-DEMOS/Async is slightly slower due to
the extra Uniqueness Certificate producing round.
Figure 15 shows the throughput of both our vote collection protocols, versus the number of vote
collectors, under different concurrency levels. We observe that, in terms of overall system through-
put, the penalty of tolerating extra failures (increasing the number of vote collectors) manifests early
on. We notice an almost 50% decline in system throughput from 4 to 7 VC nodes for D-DEMOS/IC,
and a bigger one for D-DEMOS/Async. However, further increases in the number of vote collectors
lead to a much smoother, linear decrease. Overall, D-DEMOS/IC achieves better throughput than
D-DEMOS/Async, due to exchanging fewer messages and lacking signature operations.
In Figure 16, we plot a different view of both our systems’ throughput, this time versus the
concurrency level (ranging from 100 to 2000). Plots represent number of VC node settings (4 to
16), thus different fault tolerance levels. Results show both our systems have the nice property of
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Fig. 17. Vote Collection response time of D-DEMOS/IC (17a) and D-DEMOS/Async (17b), versus the number of VC
nodes, under a WAN setting. Election parameters are n = 200,000 and m = 4.
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Fig. 18. Vote Collection throughput of D-DEMOS/IC (18a) and D-DEMOS/Async (18b), versus the number of VC nodes,
under a WAN setting. Election parameters are n = 200,000 and m = 4.
delivering nearly constant throughput, regardless of the incoming request load, for a given number
of VC nodes.
We repeat the same experiment by emulating a WAN environment using
netem [Hemminger et al. 2005], a network emulator for Linux. We inject a uniform latency
of 25ms (typical for US coast-to-coast communication [Grigorik 2013]) for each network packet
exchanged between vote collector nodes, and present our results in Figures 17, 18, and 19. A simple
comparison between LAN and WAN plots illustrates our system manages to deliver the same level
of throughput and average response time, regardless of the increased intra-VC communication
latency.
The benefits of the in memory approach, expressed both in terms of sub-second client (voter) re-
sponse time and increased system throughput, make it an attractive alternative to the more standard
database setup. For instance, in cases where high-end server machines are available, it would be
possible to service mid to large scale elections completely from memory. We estimate the size of
the in-memory representation of a n = 200K ballot election, with m = 4 options, at approximately
322MB (see [Maneas 2015] for derivation details). In this size, we include 64-bit Java pointers over-
head, as we are using simple hash-maps of plain old Java classes. This size can be decreased con-
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Fig. 19. Vote Collection throughput of D-DEMOS/IC (19a) and D-DEMOS/Async (19b), versus the number of concur-
rent clients, under a WAN setting. Plots illustrate performance for different cardinalities of VC nodes, thus different fault
tolerance settings. Election parameters are n = 200,000 and m = 4.
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Fig. 20. This figure illustrates the duration of all system phases. Results depicted are for 4 VCs, n = 200,000 and m = 4.
All phases are disk based.
siderably in a more elaborate implementation, where data is serialized by Google Protocol Buffers,
for example.
Finally, in Figure 20, we illustrate a breakdown of the duration of each phase of the complete
voting system (D-DEMOS/IC and D-DEMOS/Async), versus the total number of ballots cast. We
assume immediate phase succession, i.e., the vote collection phase ends when all votes have been
cast, at which point the vote set consensus phase starts, and so on. The “Push to BB and encrypted
tally” phase is the time it takes for the vote collectors to push the final vote code set to the BB nodes,
including all actions necessary by the BB to calculate and publish the encrypted result. The “Publish
result” phase is the time it takes for trustees to calculate and push their share of the opening of the
final tally to the BB, and for the BB to publish the final tally. Note that, in most voting procedures,
the vote collection phase would in reality last several hours and even days as stipulated by national
law (see Estonia voting system). Thus, looking only at the post-election phases of the system, we see
that the time it takes to publish the final tally on the BB is quite fast. Comparing the two versions of
D-DEMOS, we observe D-DEMOS/IC is faster during both Vote Collection and Vote Set Consensus
phases. This is expected, because of the extra communication round of D-DEMOS/Async during
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voting, as well as the more complex consensus-per-ballot approach to achieving Vote Set Consensus.
However, D-DEMOS/Async is more robust than D-DEMOS/IC, as it does not require any kind of
synchronization between nodes.
Overall, although we introduced Byzantine Fault Tolerance across all phases of a voting system
(besides setup), we demonstrate it achieves high performance, enough to run real-life elections of
large electorate bodies.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented the world’s first suite of state-of-the-art, end-to-end verifiable, distributed inter-
net voting systems with no single point of failure besides setup. Both systems allow voters to verify
their vote was tallied-as-intended without the assistance of special software or trusted devices, and
external auditors to verify the correctness of the election process. Additionally, the systems al-
lows voters to delegate auditing to a third party auditor, without sacrificing their privacy. We have
provided a model and security analysis of both voting systems. Finally, we have implemented pro-
totypes of the integrated systems, measured their performance, and demonstrated their ability to
handle large-scale elections.
We have used our system to conduct exit polls at three large voting sites for two national-level
elections. We look forward to gaining more experience and feedback about our systems by
exploring their use in election and decision-making procedures at all levels throughout the Greek
university system, and studying their adoption for use by the General Confederation of Greek
Workers, the largest civil union of workers in Greece. Finally, our systems currently support only
1-out-of-m elections, in which voters choose one out of m options from their ballots. As future
work, we will expand our systems to support k-out-of-m elections.
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A. SECURITY OF D-DEMOS
In this section, we present at length the security properties that D-DEMOS achieves. Specifically,
we show that D-DEMOS/IC and D-DEMOS/Async achieve liveness and safety, according to which
every voter that submits her vote prior to a well-defined time threshold, will obtain a valid receipt
(liveness) and her vote will be included in the election tally and published in the BB (safety con-
tract). In addition, both versions achieve end-to-end verifiability and voter privacy at the same level
as [Kiayias et al. 2015]2, thus allowing a top-tier integrity guarantee without compromising secrecy.
We use m, n to denote the number of options and voters respectively. We denote by λ the cryp-
tographic security parameter and we write negl(λ) to denote that a function is negligible in λ, i.e.,
it is asymptotically smaller than the inverse of any polynomial in λ.
The remaining sections reference heavily the Cryptographic Tools section (2.3), which includes
the notions and claims about the security of the cryptographic tools we use in the two versions of
D-DEMOS.
A.1. Liveness
To prove the liveness that D-DEMOS guarantees, we assume (i) an upper bound δ on the delay of
the delivery of messages and (ii) an upper bound∆ on the drift of all clocks (see Assumptions B and
2In [Kiayias et al. 2015], the authors use the term voter privacy/receipt-freeness, but they actually refer to the same property.
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C in Section 4.3). Furthermore, to express liveness rigorously, we formalize the behavior of honest
voters regarding maximum waiting before vote resubmission as follows:
Definition A.1 ([d]-PATIENCE). Let V be an honest voter that submits her vote at some VC
node when Clock[V ] = T . We say that V is [d]-patient, when the following condition holds: If V
does not obtain a valid receipt by the time that Clock[V ] = T + d, then she will blacklist this VC
node and submit the same vote to another randomly selected VC node.
A.1.1. Liveness of D-DEMOS/IC. Using Definition A.1, we prove the liveness of D-DEMOS/IC in
the following theorem. A crucial step in the proof, is to compute an upper bound on the time required
for an honest responder V C node to issue a receipt to V . This bound will be derived by the time
upper bounds that correspond to each step of the voting protocol, as described in Sections 4.5.1
and 4.6, taking also into account the ∆, δ upper bounds.In Fig. 21, we provide upper bounds on the
advance of the global clock and the internal clocks of V and the VC nodes, so that we illustrate the
description of the computation described below.
Step Time upper bounds at each clock
Clock Clock[V ] Clock[V C]
honest VC
nodes’ clocks
V is initialized T T T +∆ T +∆
V submits her vote to
V C
T + Tcomp +∆ T + Tcomp T + Tcomp + 2∆ T + Tcomp + 2∆
V C receives V ’s ballot T +Tcomp+∆+δ T+Tcomp+2∆+δ T+Tcomp+2∆+δ T+Tcomp+2∆+δ
V C verifies the validity
of V ’s ballot and
broadcasts its share
T + 2Tcomp +
3∆+ δ
T + 2Tcomp +
4∆ + δ
T + 2Tcomp +
2∆ + δ
T + 2Tcomp +
4∆ + δ
All the other honest VC
nodes receive V C’s
share
T + 2Tcomp +
3∆ + 2δ
T + 2Tcomp +
4∆ + 2δ
T + 2Tcomp +
4∆ + 2δ
T + 2Tcomp +
4∆ + 2δ
All the other honest VC
nodes verify the
validity of V ’s share
and broadcast their
shares
T + 3Tcomp +
5∆ + 2δ
T + 3Tcomp +
6∆ + 2δ
T + 3Tcomp +
6∆ + 2δ
T + 3Tcomp +
4∆ + 2δ
V C receives all the
Nv − 1 other honest
VC nodes’ shares
T + 3Tcomp +
5∆ + 3δ
T + 3Tcomp +
6∆ + 3δ
T + 3Tcomp +
6∆ + 3δ
T + 3Tcomp +
6∆ + 3δ
V C verifies the validity
of all the Nv − 1 other
honest VC nodes’
shares
T + (Nv +
2)Tcomp+7∆+3δ
T + (Nv +
2)Tcomp+8∆+3δ
T + (Nv +
2)Tcomp+6∆+3δ
T + (Nv +
2)Tcomp+8∆+3δ
V C reconstructs and
sends V ’s receipt
T + (Nv +
3)Tcomp+7∆+3δ
T + (Nv +
3)Tcomp+8∆+3δ
T + (Nv +
3)Tcomp+6∆+3δ
T + (Nv +
3)Tcomp+8∆+3δ
V obtains her receipt T + (Nv +
3)Tcomp+7∆+4δ
T + (Nv +
3)Tcomp+8∆+4δ
T + (Nv +
3)Tcomp+8∆+4δ
T + (Nv +
3)Tcomp+8∆+4δ
V verifies the validity
of her receipt
T + (Nv +
4)Tcomp+7∆+4δ
T + (Nv +
4)Tcomp+8∆+4δ
T + (Nv +
4)Tcomp+8∆+4δ
T + (Nv +
4)Tcomp+8∆+4δ
Fig. 21. Time upper bounds at Clock,Clock[V ], Clock[V C] and other honest VC nodes’ clocks at each step of the
interaction of the voter V with responder V C during D-DEMOS/IC voting phase. The grayed cells indicate the reference
point of the clock drifts at each step.
THEOREM A.2 (LIVENESS OF D-DEMOS/IC). Consider a D-DEMOS/IC run with n voters,
m options and Nv VC nodes. Let A be an adversary against D-DEMOS/IC under the model de-
scribed in Section 4.3 that corrupts up to fv < Nv/3 VC nodes. Assume there is an upper bound ∆
on clock synchronization loss and an upper bound δ on the delay of message delivery among honest
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VC nodes. Let Tcomp be the worst-case running time of any procedure run by the VC nodes and the
voters described in Sections 4.5.1 and 4.6 respectively, during the voting protocol.
Let Tend denote the election end time. Define
Twait := (Nv + 4)Tcomp + 8∆+ 4δ .
Then, the following conditions hold:
(1) Every [Twait]-patient voter V that is engaged in the voting protocol by the time that Clock[V ] =
Tend − (fv + 1) · Twait, will obtain a valid receipt.
(2) Every [Twait]-patient voter V that is engaged in the voting protocol by the time that Clock[V ] =
Tend − y · Twait, where y ∈ [fv], will obtain a valid receipt with more than 1− 3−y probability.
PROOF. Let V be a [Twait]-patient voter initialized by the adversary A when Clock =
Clock[V ] = T . Upon initialization, V ’s internal clock is synchronized with the global clock at
time Clock = Clock[V ] = T . After at most Tcomp steps, V submits her vote (serial-no, vote-code)
at internal clock time: Clock[V ] = T + Tcomp, hence at global clock time: Clock ≤ T +∆. Thus,
V C will receive the vote of V at internal time Clock[V C] ≤ (T + Tcomp) + 2∆ + δ. Then, V C
performs at most Tcomp steps to verify the validity of the vote before it broadcasts its receipt share.
All the other honest VC nodes will receive V C’s receipt share by global clock time:
Clock ≤ (T + Tcomp + 2∆ + δ) + (Tcomp +∆+ δ) = T + 2Tcomp + 3∆+ 2δ,
which implies that the time at their internal clocks is at most T + 2Tcomp + 4∆ + 2δ. Then, they
will verify V C’s share and broadcast their shares for V ’s vote after at most Tcomp steps. The global
clock at that point is no more than
Clock ≤ (T + 2Tcomp + 4∆ + 2δ) + Tcomp +∆ = T + 3Tcomp + 5∆+ 2δ.
Therefore, V C will obtain the other honest VC nodes’ shares at most when
Clock[V C] ≤ (T + 3Tcomp + 5∆+ 2δ) + ∆ + δ = T + 3Tcomp + 6∆+ 3δ
and will process them in order to reconstruct the receipt for V . In order to collect Nv − fv − 1
receipt shares that are sufficient for reconstruction, V C may have to perform up to Nv − 1 receipt-
share verifications, as the fv malicious VC nodes may also send invalid messages. This verification
requires at most (Nv − 1) · Tcomp steps. Taking into account the Tcomp steps for the reconstruction
process, we conclude that V C will finish computation by global time
= (T + 3Tcomp + 6∆+ 3δ) + (Nv − 1)Tcomp + Tcomp +∆ = T + (Nv + 3)Tcomp + 7∆+ 3δ.
Finally, V will obtain the receipt after at most δ delay from the moment that V C finishes compu-
tation, and she needs Tcomp steps to verify the validity of this receipt. Taking into consideration the
drift on V ’s internal clock, we have that if V is honest and has not yet obtained a receipt by the time
that
Clock[V ] =
(
T + (Nv + 3)Tcomp + 7∆ + 3δ
)
+ Tcomp +∆+ δ = T + Twait,
then, being [Twait]-patient, she can blacklist V C and resubmit her vote to another VC node. We will
show that the latter fact implies conditions (1) and (2) in the statement of the theorem:
Condition (1): since there are at most fv malicious VC nodes, V will certainly run into an
honest VC node at her (fv + 1)-th attempt (if reached). Therefore, if V is engaged in the voting
protocol by the time that Clock[V ] = Tend − (fv + 1) · Twait, then she will obtain a receipt.
Condition (2): if V has waited for more than y ·Twait time and has not yet received a receipt, then
it has run at least y failed attempts in a row. At the j-th attempt, V has fv − (j − 1)
Nv − (j − 1)
probability
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to randomly select one of the remaining fv − (j − 1) malicious VC nodes out of the Nv − (j − 1)
non-blacklisted VC nodes. Thus, the probability that V runs at least y failed attempts in a row is
y∏
j=1
fv − (j − 1)
Nv − (j − 1)
=
y∏
j=1
fv − (j − 1)
3fv + 1− (j − 1)
< 3−y.
Therefore, if V is engaged in the voting protocol by the time that Clock[V ] = Tend − y · Twait, then
the probability that she will obtain a receipt is more than 1− 3−y.
A.1.2. Liveness of D-DEMOS/Async. The proof of liveness in the asynchronous version of D-
DEMOS differs from the one of D-DEMOS/IC in the computation of the Twait upper bound, which
now depends on the steps of the VC nodes presented in Section 4.5.2. The upper bounds on the
advance of the the global clock and the internal clocks of V and the VC nodes is analogously
differentiated, as depicted in Fig. 22.
THEOREM A.3 (LIVENESS OF D-DEMOS/ASYNC). Consider a D-DEMOS/Async run with
n voters, m options and Nv VC nodes. Let A be an adversary against D-DEMOS/Async with m
options and n voters under the model described in Section 4.3 that corrupts up to fv < Nv/3 VC
nodes. Assume there is an upper bound ∆ on clock synchronization loss and an upper bound δ on
the delay of message delivery among honest VC nodes. Let Tcomp be the worst-case running time of
any procedure run by the VC nodes and the voters described in Sections 4.5.2 and 4.6 respectively,
during the voting protocol.
Let Tend denote the election end time. Define
Twait := (2Nv + 5)Tcomp + 12∆+ 6δ .
Then, the following conditions hold:
(1) Every [Twait]-patient voter that is engaged in the voting protocol by the time that Clock[V ] =
Tend − (fv + 1) · Twait, will obtain a valid receipt.
(2) Every [Twait]-patient voter that is engaged in the voting protocol by the time that Clock[V ] =
Tend − y · Twait, where y ∈ [fv], will obtain a valid receipt with more than 1− 3−y probability.
PROOF. The Twait upper bound is computed according to the diagram in Figure 10. Following
the reasoning in the proof of Theorem A.2, we get that
Twait := (2Nv + 5)Tcomp + 12∆+ 6δ .
Subsequently, we show that conditions (1) and (2) hold for any [Twait]-patient voter, exactly as in
the proof of Theorem A.2.
A.2. Safety
D-DEMOS’s safety guarantee is expressed as a contract adhered by the VC subsystem, stated in Sec-
tion 4.2. This contract is fulfilled by both D-DEMOS versions, though D-DEMOS/IC requires some
additional assumptions to hold, as compared with D-DEMOS/Async that assumes only fault toler-
ance of the underlying subsystems (see Section 4.3). Moreover, the proofs of safety of the two ver-
sions diverge. Specifically, the safety of D-DEMOS/IC relies on the security of the fixed SHA-256
hash function and the AES-128-CBC$ symmetric encryption scheme. Therefore, the safety state-
ment is with respect to specific security parameters. On the contrary, the safety of D-DEMOS/Async
depends on the RSA signature scheme, therefore our analysis follows an asymptotic approach.
A.2.1. Safety of D-DEMOS/IC. As in liveness, we assume the upper bounds δ,∆ on the delay of
message delivery and the drifts of all nodes’ clocks to implement Tend and Tbarrier as the starting
point and the barrier of the IC protocol. We consider 128-bit security of the commitment scheme
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Step
Time upper bounds at each clock
Clock Clock[V ] Clock[V C]
honest VC
nodes’ clocks
V is initialized T T T +∆ T +∆
V submits her vote to V C T + Tcomp +∆ T + Tcomp T + Tcomp + 2∆ T + Tcomp + 2∆
V C receives V ’s ballot T +Tcomp+∆+δ T+Tcomp+2∆+δ T+Tcomp+2∆+δ T+Tcomp+2∆+δ
V C verifies the validity of
V ’s ballot and broadcasts
an ENDORSE message
T + 2Tcomp +
3∆ + δ
T + 2Tcomp +
4∆ + δ
T + 2Tcomp +
2∆+ δ
T + 2Tcomp +
4∆ + δ
All the other honest VC
nodes receive V C’s
ENDORSE message
T + 2Tcomp +
3∆ + 2δ
T + 2Tcomp +
4∆+ 2δ
T + 2Tcomp +
4∆ + 2δ
T + 2Tcomp +
4∆ + 2δ
All the other honest VC
nodes verify the validity of
the ENDORSE message
and respond with an
ENDORSEMENT
message
T + 3Tcomp +
5∆ + 2δ
T + 3Tcomp +
6∆+ 2δ
T + 3Tcomp +
6∆ + 2δ
T + 3Tcomp +
4∆ + δ
V C receives the
ENDORSEMENT
messages of all the other
honest VC nodes
T + 3Tcomp +
5∆ + 3δ
T + 3Tcomp +
6∆+ 3δ
T + 3Tcomp +
6∆ + 3δ
T + 3Tcomp +
6∆ + 3δ
V C verifies the validity of
all the Nv − 1 received
messages until it obtains
Nv − fv valid
ENDORSEMENT
messages
T + (Nv +
2)Tcomp+7∆+3δ
T + (Nv +
2)Tcomp+8∆+3δ
T + (Nv +
2)Tcomp+6∆+3δ
T + (Nv +
2)Tcomp+8∆+3δ
V C forms UCERT
certificate and broadcsts its
share and UCERT
T + (Nv +
3)Tcomp+7∆+3δ
T + (Nv +
3)Tcomp+8∆+3δ
T + (Nv +
3)Tcomp+6∆+3δ
T + (Nv +
3)Tcomp+8∆+3δ
All the other honest VC
nodes receive V C’s
broadcast share and
UCERT
T + (Nv +
3)Tcomp+7∆+4δ
T + (Nv +
3)Tcomp+8∆+4δ
T + (Nv +
3)Tcomp+8∆+4δ
T + (Nv +
3)Tcomp+8∆+4δ
All the other honest VC
nodes verify the validity of
UCERT and V ’s share and
broadcast their shares
T + (Nv +
4)Tcomp+9∆+4δ
T + (Nv +
4)Tcomp + 10∆ +
4δ
T + (Nv +
4)Tcomp + 10∆ +
4δ
T + (Nv +
4)Tcomp+8∆+4δ
V C receives all the other
honest VC nodes’ shares
T + (Nv +
4)Tcomp+9∆+5δ
T + (Nv +
4)Tcomp + 10∆ +
5δ
T + (Nv +
4)Tcomp + 10∆ +
5δ
T + (Nv +
4)Tcomp + 10∆ +
5δ
V C verifies the validity of
all the Nv − 1 received
messages until it obtains
Nv − fv valid shares
T + (2Nv +
3)Tcomp + 11∆ +
5δ
T + (2Nv +
3)Tcomp + 12∆ +
5δ
T + (2Nv +
3)Tcomp + 10∆ +
5δ
T + (2Nv +
3)Tcomp + 12∆ +
5δ
V C reconstructs and V ’s
receipt and sends it to V
T + (2Nv +
4)Tcomp + 11∆ +
5δ
T + (2Nv +
4)Tcomp + 12∆ +
5δ
T + (2Nv +
4)Tcomp + 10∆ +
5δ
T + (2Nv +
4)Tcomp + 12∆ +
5δ
V obtains her receipt
T + (2Nv +
4)Tcomp + 11∆ +
6δ
T + (2Nv +
4)Tcomp + 12∆ +
6δ
T + (2Nv +
4)Tcomp + 12∆ +
6δ
T + (2Nv +
4)Tcomp + 12∆ +
6δ
V verifies the validity of
her receipt
T + (2Nv +
5)Tcomp + 11∆ +
6δ
T + (2Nv +
5)Tcomp + 12∆ +
6δ
T + (2Nv +
5)Tcomp + 12∆ +
6δ
T + (2Nv +
5)Tcomp + 12∆ +
6δ
Fig. 22. Time upper bounds at Clock,Clock[V ], Clock[V C] and other honest VC nodes’ clocks at each step of the
interaction of the voter V with responder V C during D-DEMOS/Async voting phase. The grayed cells indicate the reference
point of the clock drifts at each step.
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assuming that every adversary running in less than 264 steps has no more than 2−128 probability
of obtaining any information about a single committed value (i.e., we set c = 6/7, where c is
mentioned in Section 2.3.1).
THEOREM A.4 (SAFETY OF D-DEMOS/IC). Consider a D-DEMOS/IC run with n voters, m
options, Nv VC nodes, Nb BB nodes and Nt trustees under the restriction than m · n ≤ 241. Let
A be an adversary against D-DEMOS under the model described in Section 4.3 that corrupts up to
fv < Nv/3 VC nodes, up to fb < Nb/2 BB nodes and up toNt−ht out-ofNt trustees. Assume there
is an upper bound ∆ on clock synchronization loss and an upper bound δ on the delay of message
delivery. Let Tend be the end of the voting phase and Tbarrier be the end of the value dissemination
phase of the interactive consistency protocol, as described in Section 4.3. Then, all honest voters
who received a valid receipt from a VC node, are assured that their vote will be published on the
honest BB nodes and included in the election tally, with probability at least
1−
nfv
264 − fv
−
(
3(mn)3 + 225(mn)2 + 264mn
)
· 2−125 .
PROOF. A crucial step for proving the safety of D-DEMOS/IC is to ensure it is hard for the
adversary to compute non-submitted valid vote codes from the ballots of honest voters. This is done
in the following claim.
CLAIM A.4.1: The probability that A outputs a vote code from the ballot of some honest voter V
which was not cast by V is less than
(
3(mn)3 + 225(mn)2 + 264mn
)
· 2−125 .
Proof of Claim A.4.1: Let C be the set of all vote codes generated by the EA. An arbitrary execution
of A determines the following subsets of C: (i) the set of vote codes C1 that all honest voters
submitted at the election phase , (ii) the set of the vote codes C2 located in unused ballots of honest
voters that did not engage in the voting protocol and (iii) the set of vote codes C3 in the ballots of
corrupted voters.
Since every vote code is a random 128-bit string, the event that A guesses some of the 2mn
vote codes can happen with no more than 2mn(2−128) = 2−127mn probability. Furthermore, A
is restricted by the fault tolerance thresholds of the VC, BB and trustees subsystems. Hence, by
(i) the random vote code generation, (ii) the fault tolerance thresholds, (iii) the hiding property
of the commitment scheme and (iv) the perfect simulatability of the zero-knowledge proofs, we
assume that except for some probability bounded by 2−127mn + 0 + 2−127mn + 0 = 2−126mn,
the information associated with the vote codes that A obtains is,
(i). The VC initialization data (for every VC node that A corrupts).
(ii). All the BB initialization data. The part of these data that is associated with the vote codes is
the list of all AES-128-CBC$ vote code encryptions under msk.
(iii). The set C1 ∪C2 ∪C3.
Reduction to IND-CPA security of AES-128-CBC$. Given the code of A, we construct an algorithm
B against the (t, q, (2t+258 ·q+3q2)·2−128)-IND-CPA security of the underlying AES-128-CBC$
(see Section 2.3.4). Namely, B invokes A and attempts to simulate a setup and run of D-DEMOS/IC
as follows:
1. B chooses a random triple (j∗, ℓ∗, X∗) ∈ [m]× [n]× {A,B}.
2. For every (j, ℓ,X) ∈ [m]× [n]× {A,B} \ {(j∗, ℓ∗, X∗)}, B executes the following steps:
(a) B chooses a random 64-bit vote-codeXℓ,j and associates it with optionXℓ,j .
(b) B makes an encryption query (mX0,ℓ,j,mX1,ℓ,j) = (vote-codeXℓ,j , vote-codeℓ,j)X and re-
ceives an AES-128-CBC$ encryption of vote-codeXℓ,j .
(c) B chooses a random saltXℓ,j and computes HXℓ,j ← SHA256(vote-codeXℓ,j, saltXℓ,j).
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(d) B generates the cryptographic payload payloadℓ,πX
ℓ
(j) associated with optionXℓ,j .
3. B chooses random values vote-code∗0, vote-code∗1 ∈ {0, 1}64, salt∗ ∈ {0, 1}64.
4. B makes the encryption query challenge vote-code∗0, vote-code
∗
1 and receives the AES-128-
CBC$ encryption y∗ of vote-code∗b , where b is the outcome of a coin-flip.
5. B tabulates BB initialization data as EA does, by using vote-code∗0 as the vote code associated
with optionℓ∗,j∗ , the hash SHA256(vote-code
∗
0, salt
∗) as HX
∗
ℓ∗,j∗ and y∗ as the AES-128-CBC$
ciphertext that corresponds to vote-code∗0 .
6. B interacts with A according to the model described in Section 4.3.
7. If A outputs vote-code∗0, then B outputs 0. Otherwise, B outputs 1.
Let G be the event that A outputs some vote-code ∈ C \ (C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3). By the construction
of B, if the IND-CPA challenge bit b is 0, then B simulates a D-DEMOS/IC election perfectly.
Furthermore, if b = 0 and vote-code corresponds to the randomly chosen position (j∗, ℓ∗, X∗) ∈
[m] × [n] × {A,B}, then it outputs 0 (vote-code = vote-code∗0). Since B randomly guesses the
triple (ℓ∗, j∗, X∗), we have that
Pr[B outputs 1 | b = 0] = 1− Pr[B outputs 0 | b = 0] = 1− Pr[G | b = 0]
2mn
. (1)
On the other hand, if b = 1, then vote-code∗0 is the preimage of SHA256(vote-code∗0, salt∗), while
y∗ is the encryption of an independently generated vote code. Based on this observation, we con-
struct an algorithm C that acts as an attacker against the (t, t2 · 2−256)-collision resistance of SHA-
256 (see Section 2.3.3). Namely, on input some hash value H , C executes the following steps:
1. C chooses a random triple (j∗, ℓ∗, X∗) ∈ [m]× [n]× {A,B}.
2. For every (j, ℓ,X) ∈ [m] × [n] × {A,B}, C chooses random values vote-codeXℓ,j ∈
{0, 1}160, saltXℓ,j ∈ {0, 1}
64
.
3. C tabulates all election information normally except that for (ℓ∗, j∗, X∗) it provides H instead
of the hash value SHA256(vote-codeX
∗
ℓ,j , salt
X∗
ℓ,j ).
4. C interacts with A according to the model described in Section 4.3.
5. C receives the output of A, labeled by z.
6. C searches for a w ∈ {0, 1}64 s.t. h(z, w) = H . If C finds such a w, then it outputs z||w.
Otherwise, it aborts.
For simplicity and w.l.o.g., we can assume that for each (j, ℓ,X) ∈ [m] × [n] × {A,B}, the time
complexity for information preparation is on the order of 2563 (cube of the string length, set to 256
bits). The running time of A is 264. Assuming linear complexity for hashing and checking a random
value, the brute force search for the correct w in step 6. takes 264 · 256 = 272 steps. Therefore,
given that mn ≤ 241, we conclude the C runs in steps bounded by 2mn · 2563 + 264 + 264 · 256 ≤
mn225 + 264 + 272 < 273 .
By the (t, t2 · 2−256)-collision resistance of h(·) (see Section 2.3.3), the probability that C finds a
preimage of H is less than 2146 ·2−256 < 2−110. By the construction of C, if A outputs the vote code
that corresponds to position (ℓ∗, j∗, X∗) ∈ [n] × [m] × {A,B}, then C certainly wins. Therefore,
we have that
Pr[B outputs 1 | b = 1] = 1− Pr[B outputs 1 | b = 1] = 1− Pr[G | b = 1]
2mn
− 2−126mn ≥
≥ 1− Pr[C returns the preimage of SHA-256] > 1− 2−110 − 2−126mn .
(2)
Hence, by Eq. (1),(2), we conclude that
Adv
IND−CPA
128−AES−CBC$(B) >
Pr[G | b = 0]
2mn
− 2−110 − 2−126mn . (3)
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Along the lines of the time complexity analysis of C, the time complexity of B is bounded by
2mn · 2563 + 264 = 225mn + 264 < 266, where we used that mn ≤ 241, In addition, B makes
at most 2 ·m · n queries. Hence, by the (t, q, (2t + 258 · q + 3q2) · 2−128)- IND-CPA security of
AES-CBC (see Section 2.3.4) and (3), we conclude that
Pr[G | b = 0]
2mn
− 2−110 − 2−126mn < (226mn+ 265 + 516mn+ 12 · (mn)2) · 2−128 ⇒
⇒ Pr[G | b = 0] <
(
3(mn)3 + 225(mn)2 + 264mn
)
· 2−125 ,
which completes the proof of the claim, as the election simulation for b = 0 is perfect.
(End of Claim A.4.1) ⊣
Given Claim A.4.1, the proof is completed in two stages.
1.Vote set consensus. By the upper bound restriction on all clock drifts, all honest VC nodes
will enter the Value Dissemination phase at Tend and the Result Consensus phase of the Interactive
Consistency protocol at Tbarrier within some distance ∆ from the global clock. The agreement
property of interactive consistency ensures that all honest VC nodes will contain the same vector
〈V S1, . . . , V Sn〉 of all nodes’ sets of voted and pending ballots. Subsequently, all honest VC
nodes, execute the same deterministic algorithm of Figure 9, and will agree on the same set of votes
denoted by Votes. This will be the set of votes that are marked to be tallied by the honest VC nodes.
2. Protocol contract. Let Vℓ be an honest voter that has obtained a receipt for his vote
〈serial-no, vote-code〉, but his vote is not included in Votes. By the vote consensus property proved
previously, we have that some honest VC node V C, decided to discard Vℓ’s vote. According to the
algorithm described in Figure 9 that determines Votes, the latter can happen only because either
Case (i): A succeeds in guessing the valid receipt of Vℓ, or Case (ii): a vote-code-2 different than
vote-code appears in the list for the ballot indexed by serial-no or Case (iii): vote-code appears less
than Nv − 2fv times in the list for the ballot indexed by serial-no. We study all Cases (i),(ii),(iii):
Case (i). If A succeeds in guessing a valid receipt, then it can force the VC subsystem to consider
V ’s ballot not voted by not participating in the receipt reconstruction. By the information theoretic
security of the VSS scheme, given that A is restricted by the fault tolerance thresholds, its guess of
the receipt must be at random. Since there are at most fv malicious VC nodes, the adversary has at
most fv attempts to guess the receipt. Moreover, the receipt is a randomly generated 64-bit string,
so after i attempts, A has to guess among (264 − i) possible choices. Taking a union bound for n
voters, the probability that A succeeds for any of the obtained receipts is no more than
n∑
ℓ=1
( fv−1∑
i=0
1
264 − i
)
≤
nfv
264 − fv
.
Case (ii). Vℓ is honest, hence it has submitted the same vote in every possible attempt to vote prior
to the one she obtained her receipt. Therefore, Case (ii) may occur only if the adversary A manages
to produce vote-code-2 by the vote code related election information it has access to. Namely, (a)
the set of vote codes that all honest voters submitted at the election phase, (b) the set of the vote
codes that were located in unused ballots and (c) the set of vote codes in the ballots of corrupted
voters. By assumption, vote-code-2 is in neither of these three sets. Hence, by Claim A.4.1, the
probability that A computes vote-code-2 is less than
(
3(mn)3 + 225(mn)2 + 264mn
)
· 2−125.
Case (iii). In order for Vℓ to obtain a receipt, at least Nv − fv VC nodes must collaborate by
providing their shares. The faulty VC nodes are at most fv, so at least Nv − 2fv honest VC nodes
will include 〈serial-no, vote-code〉 in their set of voted and pending ballots. Thus, Case (iii) cannot
occur.
Consequently, all the honest VC nodes will forward the agreed set of votes (hence, also Vℓ’s vote)
to the BB nodes. By the fault tolerance threshold for the BB subsystem, the fb honest BB nodes will
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publish Vℓ’s vote. Finally, the ht out-of Nt honest trustees will read V ’s vote from the majority of
BB nodes and include it in the election tally. Therefore, the probability that A achieves in excluding
the vote of at least one honest voter that obtained a valid receipt from the BB or the election tally is
less than nfv
264 − fv
−
(
3(mn)3 + 225(mn)2 + 264mn
)
· 2−125, which completes the proof.
A.2.2. Safety of D-DEMOS/Async. The safety of D-DEMOS/Async is founded on the certificate
generation mechanism among the VC nodes, which in turn exploits the security of the underlying
signature scheme.
THEOREM A.5 (SAFETY OF D-DEMOS/ASYNC). Let A be an adversary against D-DEMOS
under the model described in Section 4.3 that corrupts up to fv < Nv/3 VC nodes, up to fb < Nb/2
BB nodes and up to Nt− ht out-of Nt trustees. Then, all honest voters who received a valid receipt
from a VC node, are assured that their vote will be published on the honest BB nodes and included
in the election tally, with probability at least
1−
nfv
264 − fv
− negl(λ) .
PROOF. Let Vℓ be an honest voter. Then, A’s strategy on attacking safety (i.e., provide a valid
receipt to Vℓ but force the VC subsystem to discard V ’s ballot), is captured by either one of the two
following cases: Case (i): A produces the receipt without being involved in a complete interaction
with the VC subsystem (i.e., with at least fv+1 honest VC nodes). Case (ii): A provides a properly
reconstructed receipt via a complete interaction with the VC subsystem (in both cases we assume A
controls the responder VC node).
Let E1 (resp. E2) be the event that Case 1 (resp. Case 2) happens. We study both cases:
Case (i). In this case, A must produce a receipt that matches V ’s ballot with less than Nv − fv
shares. A may achieve this by either one of the following ways:
1. A attempts to guess the valid receipt; If A succeeds, then it can force the VC subsystem to
consider V ’s ballot not voted as no valid UCERT certificate will be generated for V ’s ballot (ma-
licious responder does not send an ENDORSE message). As shown in the proof of Theorem A.4,
the probability of a successful guess for A is less than nfv264−fv .
2. A attempts to produce fake UCERT certificates by forging digital signatures of other nodes. By
the security of the digital signature scheme, this attack has negl(λ) success probability.
By the above, we have that Pr[A wins |E1] ≤
nfv
264 − fv
+ negl(λ) .
Case (ii). In this case, by the security arguments stated in Section 4.5 (steps 1- 5), every honest
VC node will include the vote of Vℓ in the set of voted tuples. This is because a) it locally knows
the valid (certified) vote code for Vℓ which is accompanied by UCERT or b) it has obtained the
valid vote code via a RECOVER-REQUEST message. Recall that unless there are fake certificates
(which happens with negligible probability) there can be only one valid vote code for Vℓ.
Consequently, all the honest VC nodes will forward the agreed set of votes (hence, also Vℓ’s vote)
to the BB nodes. By the fault tolerance threshold for the BB subsystem, the fb honest BB nodes
will publish V ’s vote. Finally, the ht out-of Nt honest trustees will read Vℓ’s vote from the majority
of BB nodes and include it in the election tally. Thus, we have that Pr[A wins |E2] = negl(λ) .
Therefore, all the votes of honest voters that obtained a valid receipt, will be published on the
honest BB nodes and included in the election tally, with probability at least
1− Pr[A wins ] ≥ 1− Pr[A wins |E1]− Pr[A wins |E2] ≥ 1−
nfv
264 − fv
− negl(λ) .
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A.3. End-to-end Verifiability
E2E Verifiability Game GA,E,d,θe2e-ver (1
λ,m, n,Nv, Nb, Nt)
(i). A on input 1λ, n,m,Nv, Nb, Nt, chooses a list of options {option1, . . . , optionm}, a set of voters
V = {V1, . . . , Vn}, a set of VC nodes VC = {VC1, . . . ,VCNv}, a set of BB nodes BB =
{BB1, . . . ,BBNb}, and a set of trustees T = {T1, . . . , TNt}. It provides the challenger Ch with
all the above sets. Throughout the game, A controls the EA, all the VC nodes and all the trustees.
In addition, A may corrupt a fixed set of less than ⌊Nb/2⌋ BB nodes, denoted by BBsucc (i.e., the
majority of the BB nodes remain honest). On the other hand, Ch plays the role of all the honest BB
nodes.
(ii). A and C engage in an interaction where A schedules the vote casting executions of all voters. For
each voter Vℓ, A can either completely control the voter or allow C to operate on Vℓ’s behalf, in
which case A provides C with an option selection optioniℓ . Then, C casts a vote for optioniℓ , and,
provided the voting execution terminates successfully, C obtains the audit information auditℓ on
behalf of Vℓ.
(iii). Finally, A posts a version of the election transcript infoj in every honest BB node BBj /∈ BBcorr.
Let Vsucc be the set of honest voters (i.e., those controlled by C) that terminated successfully. The game
returns a bit which is 1 if and only if the following conditions hold true:
(1) ∀BBj ,BBj′ /∈ BBcorr : infoj = infoj′ := info
(2) |Vsucc| ≥ θ (i.e., at least θ honest voters terminated).
(3) ∀ℓ ∈ [n] : if Vℓ ∈ Vsucc then Vℓ verifies successfully, when given (info, auditℓ) as input.
and either one of the following two conditions:
(4) (a) if ⊥ 6= 〈optioniℓ〉Vℓ /∈Vsucc ← E(info, {auditℓ}Vℓ∈Vsucc) then
d1
(
Result(info), F (optioni1 . . . , optionin)
)
≥ d .
(b) ⊥ ← E(info, {auditℓ}Vℓ∈Vsucc).
Fig. 23. The E2E Verifiability Game between the challenger C and the adversary A using the vote extractor E.
We adopt the end-to-end (E2E) verifiability definition in [Kiayias et al. 2015], modified accord-
ingly to our setting. Namely, we encode the options set {option1, . . . , optionm}, where the encoding
of optioni is an m-bit string which is 1 only in the i-th position. Let F be the election evaluationfunction such that F (optioni1 . . . , optionin) is equal to an m-vector whose i-th location is equal to
the number of times optioni was voted. Then, we use the metric d1 derived by the L1-norm scaled to
half, i.e., d1(R,R′) = 12 ·
∑n
i=1 |Ri−R
′
i|, where Ri, R′i is the i-th coordinate of R,R′ respectively,
to measure the success probability of the adversary with respect to the amount of tally deviation d
and the number of voters that perform audit θ. In addition, we make use of a vote extractor algorithm
E (not necessarily running in polynomial-time) that extracts the non-honestly cast votes.
We define E2E verifiability via an attack game between a challenger and an adversary specified
in detail in Figure 23.
Definition A.6 (E2E VERIFIABILITY). Let 0 < ǫ < 1 and n,m,Nv, Nb, Nt ∈ N polynomial
in the security parameter λ with θ ≤ n. Let Π be an e-voting system with n voters, Nv VC nodes,
Nb BB nodes and Nt trustees. We say that Π achieves end-to-end verifiability with error ǫ, w.r.t. the
election function F , a number of θ honest successful voters and tally deviation d if there exists a
(not necessarily polynomial-time) vote extractor E such that for any PPT adversary A it holds that
Pr[GA,E,d,θe2e-ver (1
λ,m, n,Nv, Nb, Nt) = 1] ≤ ǫ.
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To prove E2E verifiability of D-DEMOS, we need a min-entropy variant of the Schwartz-Zippel
lemma, to check the equality of two univariate polynomials p1, p2, i.e., test p1(x) − p2(x) = 0 for
random x D← Zq , where q is prime. The probability that the test passes is at most max(d1,d2)2κ if p1 6=
p2, where di is the degree of pi for i ∈ {1, 2}. We leverage Lemma A.7 from [Kiayias et al. 2015].
LEMMA A.7 (MIN-ENTROPY SCHWARTZ-ZIPPEL [KIAYIAS ET AL. 2015]). Let q be a
prime and p(x) be a non-zero univariate polynomial of degree d over Zq . Let D be a probabil-
ity distribution on Zq such that H∞(D) ≥ κ. The probability of p(x) = 0 for a randomly chosen
x
D
← Zq is at most d2κ .
We now analyse the soundness of the zero knowledge proof for each option encoding commit-
ment. Note that a correct option encoding is an m-vector, where one of the m elements is 1 and the
rest elements are 0 (a.k.a. unit vector). Our zero knowledge proof utilizes the Chaum-Pedersen
DDH-tuple proofs [Chaum and Pedersen 1993] in conjunction with the Sigma OR-composition
technique [Cramer et al. 1994] to show each (lifted) ElGamal ciphertext encrypts either 0 or 1 and
the product of all the m ElGamal ciphertexts encrypts 1. We adopt the soundness amplification
technique from [Kiayias et al. 2015]; namely, if the voters’ coins c are longer than ⌊log q⌋ then we
divide it into κ blocks, (c1, c2, . . . , cκ) such that each block has less than ⌊log q⌋ coins, where q is
the order of the underlying group used in the ElGamal encryption. Given a statement x, for each ci,
i ∈ [κ], the prover needs to produce the zero knowledge transcript (x, φ1,i, ci, φ2,i) in order. The
verifier accepts the proof if and only if for all i ∈ [κ], Verify(x, φ1,i, ci, φ2,i) = accept. Hence, we
have the following Lemma A.8.
LEMMA A.8. Denote c = (c1, c2, . . . , cκ). If H∞(c) = θ, we have for all adversaries A:
ε(m,n, θ, κ) = Pr


(x, {φ1,i}i∈[κ])← A(1
λ);
{φ2,i}i∈[κ] ← A(c1, c2, . . . , cκ) :
x is not a valid option encoding commitment
∧∀i ∈ [κ],Verify(x, φ1,i, ci, φ2,i) = accept

 ≤ 2−θ .
PROOF. For i ∈ κ, denote H∞(ci) = θi, and
∑κ
i=1 θi = θ. Chaum-Pedersen DDH-tuple
proof [Chaum and Pedersen 1993] internally constructs and checks a degree-1 polynomial; there-
fore according to Lemma A.7, the probability that the adversary A to cheat a single DDH-tuple zero
knowledge proof is at most 2−θ′ , where θ′ is the min-entropy of the challenge. Moreover, Sigma
OR-composition technique [Cramer et al. 1994] perfectly maintains the soundness, so the probabil-
ity that the adversary A to cheat the zero knowledge proofs for each (lifted) ElGamal ciphertext
encrypts 0/1 is at most 2−θ′ . Note that the zero knowledge proofs of the option encoding commit-
ment is AND-composition of all the elementary zero knowledge proofs, the probability that x is
invalid and Verify(x, φ1,i, ci, φ2,i) = accept is at most 2−θi . Hence, the probability that ∀i ∈ [κ],
Verify(x, φ1,i, ci, φ2,i) = accept is ε(m,n, θ, κ) =
∏κ
i=1 2
−θi = 2−
∑
κ
i=1 θi = 2−θ.
Applying Lemma A.8, we prove that D-DEMOS (both the IC and the Async version) achieves
E2E verifiability according to Definition A.6.
PROOF. Without loss of generality, we can assume that every party can read consistently the
data published in the majority of the BB nodes, as otherwise the adversary fails to satisfy either
condition ?? or 1 of the E2E verifiability game.
We first construct a vote extractor E for D-DEMOS as follows:
• E takes input as the election transcript, info and a set of audit information {auditℓ}Vℓ∈Vsucc . If info is
not meaningful, then E outputs ⊥.
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• Let B ≤ |V˜| be the number of different serial numbers that appear in {auditℓ}Vℓ∈V˜. E (arbitrar-
ily) arranges the voters in Vℓ ∈ Vsucc and the serial numbers not included in {auditℓ}Vℓ∈Vsucc as
〈V Eℓ 〉ℓ∈[n−|Vsucc|] and 〈tagEℓ 〉ℓ∈[n−B] respectively.
• For every ℓ ∈ [n − |Vsucc|], E extracts optioniℓ by brute force opening and decrypting (in superpoly-
nomial time) all the committed and encrypted BB data, or sets optioniℓ as the zero vector, in case Vℓ’s
vote is not published in the BB.
• If there is an invalid option-commitment (i.e., it is not a commitment to some candidate encoding)
,then E outputs ⊥. Otherwise, it outputs 〈optioniℓ 〉Vℓ /∈Vsucc .
We will prove the E2E verifiability of D-DEMOS based on E. Assume an adversary A that wins
the game GA,E,d,θe2e-ver (1λ,m, n,Nv, Nb, Nt). Namely, A breaks E2E verifiability by allowing at least
θ honest successful voters and achieving tally deviation d.
Let Z be the event that A attacks by making at least one of the option-encoding commitments
associated with some cast vote code invalid (i.e., it is in tally set Etally but it is not a commitment to
some candidate encoding). By condition 2, there are at least θ honest and successful voters, hence
the min-entropy of the collected voters’ coins is at least θ. By Lemma A.8, the zero-knowledge
proofs used in D-DEMOS for committed ballot correctness in the BB is sound except for some
probability error 2−θ. Since θ ≥ 1 and condition 3 holds, there is at least one honest voter that
verifies, thus we have that Pr[GA,E,d,θe2e-ver (1λ,m, n,Nv, Nb, Nt) = 1 ∧ Z] ≤ 2−θ .
Now assume that Z does not occur. In this case, the vote extractor E will output the intended
adversarial votes up to permutation. Thus, the deviation from the intended result that A achieves,
derives only by miscounting the honest votes. This may be achieved by A in two different possible
ways:
— Modification attacks. When committing to the information of some honest voter’s ballot part
A changes the vote code and option correspondence that is printed in the ballot. This attack will
be detected if the voter does chooses to audit with the modified ballot part (it uses the other part
to vote). The maximum deviation achieved by this attack is 1 (the vote will count for another
candidate).
— Clash attacks. A provides y honest voters with ballots that have the same serial number, so
that the adversary can inject y − 1 votes of his preference in the y − 1 “empty” audit locations
in the BB. This attack is successful only if all the y voters verify the same ballot on the BB and
hence miss the injected votes that produce the tally deviation. The maximum deviation achieved
by this attack is y − 1.
We stress that if Z does not occur, then the above two attacks are the only meaningful3 for A to
follow. Indeed, if (i) all zero knowledge proofs are valid, (ii) all the honest voters are pointed to
a unique audit BB location indexed by the serial number on their ballots, and (iii) the information
committed in this BB location matches the vote code and option association in the voters’ unused
ballot parts, then by the binding property of the commitments, all the tally computed by the com-
mitments included in Etally will decrypt to the actual intended result.
Since the honest voters choose the used ballot parts at random, the success probability of x
deviation via the modification attack is (1/2)x. In addition, the success probability to clash y
honest voters is (1/2)y−1 (all y honest voters choose the same version to vote). As a result, by
combinations of modification and clash attacks, A’s success probability reduces by a factor 1/2 for
every unit increase of tally deviation. Therefore, the upper bound of the success probability of A
3By meaningful we mean that the attack is not trivially detected. For example, the adversary may post malformed information
in the BB nodes but if so, it will certainly fail at verification.
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when Z does not occur is Pr[GA,E,d,θe2e-ver (1λ,m, n,Nv, Nb, Nt) = 1 | ¬Z] ≤ 2−d .
Hence, we conclude that Pr[GA,E,d,θe2e-ver (1λ,m, n,Nv, Nb, Nt) = 1] ≤ 2−θ + 2−d .
Applying Lemma A.8, the following theorem states that D-DEMOS (both the IC and the Async
version) achieves E2E verifiability according to Definition A.6.
THEOREM A.9 (E2E VERIFIABILITY OF D-DEMOS). Let n,m,Nv, Nb, Nt, θ, d ∈ N where
1 ≤ θ ≤ n. Then, D-DEMOS run with n voters, m options, Nv VC nodes, Nb BB nodes and Nt
trustees achieves end-to-end with error 2−θ + 2−d, w.r.t. the election function F , a number of θ
honest successful voters and tally deviation d.
PROOF. (Sketch). Without loss of generality, we can assume that every party can read consis-
tently the data published in the majority of the BB nodes, as otherwise the adversary fails to satisfy
condition 1 of the E2E verifiability game. Via brute force search, the vote extractor E for D-DEMOS
either (i) decrypts the adversarial votes (up to permutation) if all respective option-encoding com-
mitments are valid, or (ii) aborts otherwise. We analyze the two cases
(i) If all option-encoding commitments are valid, then the output of E implies that the tally de-
viation that the adversary A can achieve may derive only by attacking the honest voter. Namely,
by pointing the honest voter to audit in a BB location where the audit data is inconsistent with the
respective information in at least one part of the voter’s ballot. As in [Kiayias et al. 2015, Theorem
4], we can show that every such single attack has 1/2 success probability (the voter had chosen to
vote with the inconsistent ballot part) and in case of success, adds 1 to the tally deviation. Thus, in
this case, the probability that A causes tally deviation d is no more than 2−d.
(ii) If there is an invalid option-encoding commitment (E aborts), then the min entropy provided
by at least θ honest succesful voters is at least θ. Thus, by Lemma A.8, the Sigma protocol verifica-
tion will fail except from some soundness error 2−θ.
The proof is completed by taking the union bound on the two cases.
A.4. Voter Privacy
Our privacy definition extends the one used in [Kiayias et al. 2015] (there referred as Voter
Privacy/Receipt-Freeness) to the distributed setting of D-DEMOS. Similarly, voter privacy is
defined via a Voter Privacy indistinguishability game as depicted in Figure 24. Note that,
our system achieves computational weak unlinkability among the privacy classes modeled by
[Bohli and Pashalidis 2011].
Definition A.10 (VOTER PRIVACY). Let 0 < ǫ < 1 and n,m,Nv, Nb, Nt ∈ N. Let Π be
an e-voting system with n voters, m options awith n voters, Nv VC nodes, Nb BB nodes and Nt
trustees w.r.t. the election function f . We say that Π achieves voter privacy with error ǫ for at most
φ corrupted voters, if there is a PPT voter simulator S such that for any PPT adversary A:∣∣Pr[GA,S,φpriv (1λ, n,m,Nv, Nb, Nt) = 1]− 1/2∣∣ = negl(λ).
In the following theorem, we prove that D-DEMOS (both the IC and the Async version) achieves
voter privacy according to Definition A.10.
THEOREM A.11 (VOTER PRIVACY OF D-DEMOS). Assume there is a constant c ∈ (0, 1)
such that for any 2λc -time adversary A, the advantage of breaking the hiding property of the under-
lying commitment scheme is Advhide(A) = negl(λ). Let c′ < c be a constant and set φ = λc
′
. Then,
D-DEMOS run with n voters, m options, Nv VC nodes, Nb BB nodes and Nt trustees achieves
voter privacy for at most φ corrupted voters.
PROOF. To prove voter privacy, we explicitly construct a simulator S such that we can convert
any adversaryA who can win the privacy gameGA,S,φpriv (1λ, n,m,Nv, Nb, Nt) with a non-negligible
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Voter Privacy Game GA,S,φpriv (1
λ, n,m,Nv, Nb, Nt)
(i). A on input 1λ, n,m,Nv , Nb, Nt, chooses a list of options P = {P1, . . . , Pm}, a set of voters
V = {V1, . . . , Vn}, a set of trustees T = {T1, . . . , VNt}, a set of VC nodes {VC1, . . . ,VCNv} a
set of BB nodes {BB1, . . . ,BBNb}. It provides Ch with all the above sets. Throughout the game,
A corrupts all the VC nodes a fixed set of fb < Nb/3 BB nodes and a fixed set of ft < Nt/3
trustees. On the other hand, Ch plays the role of the EA and all the non-corrupted nodes.
(ii). Ch engages with A in an election preparation interaction following the Election Authority protocol.
(iii). Ch chooses a bit value b ∈ {0, 1}.
(iv). The adversary A and the challenger Ch engage in an interaction where A schedules the voters
which may run concurrently. For each voter Vℓ ∈ V, the adversary chooses whether Vℓ is corrupted:
— If Vℓ is corrupted, then Ch provides the credential sℓ to A, who will play the role of Vℓ to cast
the ballot.
— If Vℓ is not corrupted, then A provides two option selections 〈option0ℓ , option1ℓ 〉 to the chal-
lenger Ch which operates on Vℓ’s behalf, voting for option optionbℓ. The adversary A is al-
lowed to observe the network trace. After a ballot cast, the challenger Ch provides to A: (a) the
audit information αℓ that Vℓ obtains from the protocol, and (b) if b = 0, the current view of
the internal state of the voter Vℓ, viewℓ, that the challenger obtains during voting, or if b = 1,
a simulated view of the internal state of Vℓ produced by S(viewℓ).
(v). The adversary A and the challenger Ch produce the election tally, running the Trustee protocol. A
is allowed to observe the network trace of that protocol.
(vi). Finally, A using all information collected above (including the contents of the BB) outputs a bit b∗.
Denote the set of corrupted voters as Vcorr and the set of honest voters as V˜ = V \Vcorr. The game returns
a bit which is 1 if and only if the following hold true:
(1) b = b∗ (i.e., the adversary guesses b correctly).
(2) |Vcorr| ≤ φ (i.e., the number of corrupted voters is bounded by φ).
(3) f(〈option0ℓ〉Vℓ∈V˜) = f(〈option
1
ℓ 〉Vℓ∈V˜) (i.e., the election result w.r.t. the set of voters in V˜ does not
leak b).
Fig. 24. The Voter privacy Game between the adversary A and the challenger Ch using the simuator S.
probability into an adversaryB who can break the hiding assumption of the underlying commitment
scheme within poly(λ) · 2λc
′
<< 2λ
c
time.
Note that the challenger Ch is maintaining a coin b ∈ {0, 1} and always uses the option optionbℓ
to cast the honest voters’ ballots. When n− φ < 2, the simulator S simply outputs the real voters’
views. When n− φ ≥ 2, consider the following simulator S: At the beginning of the experiment, S
flips a coin b′ ← {0, 1}. Then, for each honest voter Vℓ, S switches the vote codes for option optionbℓ
and optionb
′
ℓ .
Due to full VC corruption, A learns all the vote codes. However, it does not help the adversary to
distinguish the simulated view from real view as the simulator only permutes vote codes. We now
can show that if A can win GA,S,φpriv (1λ, n,m,Nv, Nb, Nt), then we can construct an adversary B
that invokes A to win the IND-CPA game of the underlying ElGamal encryption. In the IND-CPA
game, B receives as input a public key pk and executes the following steps:
1. It submits challenge messages M0 = 0,M1 = 1 and receives challenge ciphertext C =
Encpk(Mb∗), where b∗ is the IND-CPA challenge bit for B.
2. It invokes A and simulates GA,S,φpriv (1λ, n,m,Nv, Nb, Nt), itself being the challenger.
3. B flips a coin b ∈ {0, 1} and uses the received public key pk as the election commitment key.
4. At the beginning, B generates/guesses all the voters coins, c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn), and uses the
coin cℓ for all the uncorrupted voter Vℓ; if some corrupted voters’ coins do not match the guessed
ones, start over again. This requires 2φ expected attempts to guess all the coins correctly.
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5. B guesses the election tally T = (T1, T2, . . . , Tm), and starts over again if the guess is incorrect.
This requires less than (n+ 1)m expected attempts.
6. B simulates all the zero knowledge proofs using the guessed voters’ coins.
7. B guesses/chooses an uncorrupted voter Vℓ′ ; the option encoding commitment of Vℓ′ ’s ballot for
the i-th option is set as
(
Encpk(T1) · C
−T1 , . . . ,Encpk(Ti−1) · C
−Ti−1 ,Encpk(Ti) · C
−(Ti−1),
Encpk(Ti+1) · C
−Ti+1 , . . . ,Encpk(Tm) · C
−Tm
)
.
For the rest of the voters, it commits the i-th option as(
Encpk(0), . . . , C · Encpk(0), . . . ,Encpk(0)
)
.
8. If Vℓ is corrupted, then B provides the credential sℓ to A.
9. If Vℓ is not corrupted, then B receives two option selections 〈option0ℓ , option1ℓ〉 from A. It then
casts the vote by submitting the vote code corresponding to optionbℓ.
10. B finishes the election according to the protocol and returns b∗ = 1 if A guesses b correctly.
Note that if C encrypts 1, the commitments on the BB are the same as the ones in a real election;
whereas, if C encrypts 0, the commitments of all the voters are commitments of 0’s except one
honest voter’s commitment is the tally results. In the latter case, the adversary A’s winning prob-
ability is exactly 1/2. Since the zero knowledge proofs are perfectly simulatable, it is easy to see
that the advantage of B is the same as the advantage of A. Moreover, the running time of B is
poly(λ) · (n+ 1)m · 2φ = O(2λ
c
′
) steps. By exploiting the distinguishing advantage of A, B can
break the hiding property of the option-encoding commitment scheme in O(2λc
′
) = o(2λ
c
) steps,
thus leading to contradiction.
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